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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to study the character­
istics and purposes of neutralization in international 
relations, and to propose neutralization of Israel as a 
way of removing the big powers from the Middle East 
conflict and of guaranteeing Israelis existence.
Historical examples of neutralization are analyzed 
to show the actions taken by neutralized nations and by 
the external nations which imposed the neutral status 
upon them. These actions consist of both those required 
initially to establish neutralization and others taken 
later to maintain it.
Neutralization is also analyzed as a device for 
accomplishing objectives, to determine what purposes it 
serves and what effects other than those intended it may 
have on both the neutralized nations and on the inter­
national system.
The historical examples are seen to vary too greatly 
for construction of a general model which could then be 
applied to Israel. Instead, the features of the Middle 
East problem and of the involvement of the big powers 
there are described, and relevant lessons learned from 
other cases are used to create a special application 
which would fit these features. The proposal, includes 
terms of a neutralization treaty.
It is recognized that a simple neutralization of 
Israel would be one-sided. The alternative of application 
to a larger Middle East area is considered and rejected; 
but some supplementary restrictions on Israel1s Arab 
neighbors are found to be necessary to make the proposal 
acceptable to Israel and the United States.
The proposed application would not settle the conflicts 
between Israel and the Arabs, nor between the Cold War 
powers; but it is suggested that it would provide some 
stability In the Middle East once the local issues are 
settled by separate agreement, and that it would also 
contribute to maintaining a balance of power between 
the Cold War powers.
vi
NEUTRALIZATION AND 
A PROPOSED APPLICATION TO ISRAEL
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an exploration of neutralization and 
its use in International politics, with a proposal for its 
application to the current critical conflict in the Middle 
East. Neutralization has been used with varying degrees 
of success in the past. Its most frequent use was in 
Europe during the nineteenth century when it was Included 
in various treaties in order to remove certain small nations 
from the arena of conflict between the great powers,
However, neutralization agreements were violated during 
both World Wars to such an extent that there has been 
little Interest in restoring them or initiating new ones 
until recently. Neutralization has been revived In recent 
years and applied in Austria and Laos. Switzerland continues 
a neutralized status which was established over a century 
ago. These three are the only examples of nations where 
neutralization is now in effect, although there are other 
recent cases in which neutralization has been or is being 
considered and areas where some features of neutralization 
are in effect.
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In this paper I will review the theory of 
neutralization, with particular emphasis on those aspects 
which might be applied in Israel. Then, in the final 
chapter, I will draw some conclusions as to how a 
neutralized status might be established and maintained in 
Israel, what purposes It might serve, and what results 
might come from it.
\4
NEUTRALIZATION defined
Neutralization was defined by Gyrus Wicker as “the
imposition by International agreement of a condition of
permanent neutrality upon lands or waterways”.
Peter l&on defined it as “the Institution of a status of
2permanent neutrality". These definitions are typical of
the commonly accepted meaning of neutralization, and
consequently will be accepted by me for the purposes of
this paper. However, they do require some clarification
to explain what Is meant by “neutrailty“ and to resolve
a possible ambiguity.
Neutrality, as used in the definition of
neutralization, means that the neutral state does not
participate in any hostile action or international engagement
3
involving hostilities with another state. In this paper,
I frequently use the terras “neutral1 and “neutrality“, when
I neutralist1 and “neutralism’1 would be more proper. The
^Cyrus French Wicker, Neutralization (London: Oxford 
.Press, 1911), p. 1.
^Peter Lyon, Neutralism (London: Leicester University, 
1963), P. 91. Also, Peter Lyon, “Neutrality, 
Neutralism, Non-alighment“, International Relations, 
Oct. 1968, 0 . 448.
3h . Lauterpacht, International Law, A Treatise,
L. Oppenhelra, 8th Ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1954) 
Vol. II, p. 244.
two latter terms refer to not taking sides in the Cold War 
rivalry between the major powers. During the Cold War, 
neutralized nations have been expected to avoid such align­
ment and therefore to be neutralist as well as neutral.
The■'■"imposition1 of neutrality implies positive actions 
taken by powers external to the nation being neutralized.
They must recognize or guarantee the status of neutrality.
Yet, neutrality is commonly perceived also as a policy or 
actions taken by the “neutral" nation itself. Neutralization 
therefore implies actions taken by the neutralized nation 
as well as by the external powers. There is thus an 
apparent ambiguity concerning the question of. whether 
neutralization is self-imposed or imposed from without.
Both of these aspects discussed above will be covered in 
detail in this paper, and they will be referred to as the 
“external" and "internal" aspects.
We can consider both Austria and nineteenth-century 
Belgium as examples of neutralization, although formal action 
to impose neutralization on Austria has been Incomplete, and 
Belgium did not assume the obligations of a neutralized 
nation. Wicker resolved this matter in 1911 by stating 
that there are two types of neutralization. However, recent 
developments have shown that a single definition which 
includes both of these aspects is more useful. For example, 
Brierly states that a neutralized state is "one whose integrity
has been permanently guaranteed by international treaty,
conditional on its maintaining perpetual neutrality save
4
in its own defense11. On this basis, some authorities 
claim that Austria is not a true example of neutralization.^ 
For purposes of this paper, I will include such border-line 
cases. These and other cases fall along a range from 
extremes of self-imposed neutrality with international 
recognition at one extreme, to externally imposed neutrality 
at the other extreme. In reality, all cases fall between 
these extremes. Even Austria and Belgium contain some 
elements of both aspects, and both must be kept in mind in 
considering application in Israel. The external aspect 
concerns such questions as whether the United States and the 
Soviet Union could agree to end the Middle East arms race 
and how each of them, as well as the Arab nations, could be 
prevented from interfering with Israeli affairs. The 
internal aspect concerns such questions as whether Israel 
would accept a neutral position and whether it could defend 
its own neutrality and independence.
Neutralization cannot be described adequately by brief 
definitions. Chapter Two of this paper will expand them to 
show in detail the external and Internal requirements 
necessary to the status of neutralization. There Is no
^James L. Brierly, Law of Nations. 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 
1936), p. 95> as quoted in Fred Greene, ^Neutralization 
and The Balance of Power*1, American Political Science 
Review, Dec. 1953, PP. 1041-1042.
<5Lyon. “Neutrality, Neutralism, Non-alignment",
pp. 448-449.
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1 typical” example, and each case has Its special 
characteristics. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to 
build a model of neutralization which would fit Israel,
Studies of neutralization vary in that some see 
neutrality as a astatusH and others as a “processw. As a 
status, it is permanent neutrality guaranteed by a treaty.
In this context, it might be a goal for negotiators. It is 
considered as an end rather than a means toward some other 
end. This concept is most useful for students of international 
law.
Equally useful, however, is the concept of neutralization 
as a process or device to be used to achieve other ends. For 
example, Lyon calls it a "device by which great powers... 
endeavor to remove small but strategically important 
territories outside the active sphere of international 
rivalries11.^ Once the external powers sign their treaty and 
the neutralized state announces its neutral intentions, what 
changes will thereby be brought about in the nations con­
cerned and in the international system? Neutralization may 
mean a step toward international peace and stability or it 
may not. Chapter Three will analyze the purposes behind 
neutralization, assess its success, and bring out other 
incidental results. These objectives and results of 
neutralization will then be re-examined in Chapter Four in 
light of the present situation in the Middle East.
I^^ ron, Neutralism, p. 91
8HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The concept of neutralization can be understood best 
by examining cases where it has been employed. A brief 
explanation of its applications in Switzerland, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Laos, and Austria follows. Further detail 
on these examples will be added in subsequent chapters.
Switzerland' is the classic example of neutralization. 
It was the first nation to be neutralized by international 
convention, in 1815, and remains neutralized today. Before 
this convention, Switzerland had been following a self- 
imposed policy of neutrality for over a century with respect 
to the wars between the European states, but without external 
recognition of that policy. Switzerland was unable to retain 
its neutrality when invaded by Napoleon, but after his defeat 
that status was imposed by a neutralization agreement 
Included in the Congress of Vienna and the Act of Paris, 
both in 1815• The Swiss government agreed to abide by the 
neutral status. The obligations of Switzerland and of the 
neutralizing powers were vague in many respects, but the
7Lauterpacht, Vol.II, pp. 245—246.
Lyon, Neutrailsmt p. 154.
Wicker, pp. 14-20.
Cyril E. Black et al., Neutralization And World
Politics, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ.Press,
1968), PP. 24-27.
agreement survived, anyway. Switzerland, became an important 
part of the balance of power system in Europe, and. Swiss 
neutrality succeeded, by virtue of those actions of European 
nations to maintain the balance of power as well as by 
deliberate actions of Switzerland and its neighbors to 
enforce it. Switzerland insisted on using its own military 
and diplomatic resources to enforce its neutrality. 
Switzerland was given special status by the League of Nations 
and has not Joined the United Nations. It does not want to 
be committed to use force against another nation in what it
sees as a violation of Its neutral status.
8
Belgium was neutralized after breaking away from the 
Netherlands in 1830. As a relatively small nation, Belgium 
had little chance of survival in the European rivalries of 
that time. It served as a buffer against renewal of French 
expansion to the east, and neutralization was a device to 
insure that an Independent Belgium would continue to be a 
buffer. The neutralization agreement was drawn up by the 
major European powers in 1831, and a series of treaties was 
finally concluded in 1839 when Belgium achieved its full 
independence. Belgium agreed to neutralization in return 
for its independence, but did not agree to carry out any 
obligations to maintain its neutrality. This status
^Lauterpacht, Vol.II, pp. 246-247.
Black, pp. 24-27.
G-reene, pp. 1046-1048.
William E. Llngelbach, “Belgian Neutrality: Its Origin
And Interpretation1*, American Historical Review,
Oct. 1933, PP- 48-72.
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continued until World War I, when German forces invaded 
Belgium, After that war, the Treaty of Versailles declared 
Belgian neutralization to be ended, at the request of 
Belgium. Belgian neutralization was characterized throughout 
its history by disagreement between Britain, France, and 
Prussia, over what they should do to restore Belgian
neutrality if one of them should violate it.
9Neutralization of Luxembourg took place under similar 
circumstances. It too was a buffer between France and 
Germany, and was neutralized upon gaining its independence 
from the Netherlands in I867. It had been a part of the 
Germanic federation even under Dutch rule when its fortresses 
had been armed by Prussia. When Napoleon III tried to pur­
chase it from Prussia, other nations of Europe with interests 
in Luxembourg joined with France and Prussia to neutralize It, 
avoiding a contest over its control. The tiny nation was 
also demilitarized and therefore could take no military 
actions to protect its neutral status. Although overrun by 
Germany In both World Wars, it continued to claim a neutralized 
status until 1948 when It Joined the Brussels Treaty, the 
first of several mutual security pacts with its neighbors.
The neutralization of Laos'*’0 in 1962 stopped 
dangerously increasing competition between the United States 
and the Soviet Union over control of that nation. Laos had
^Lauterpacht, Vol.II, p. 244.
Black, pp. 24-2?• 
lOBlack, pp. 29-31*
Arthur J. Domiaen, Conflict In Laos, (New York:
Praeger, 1964), pp. 200-303*
been given Independence from France In 1954, but a combination 
of communist forces tried to take control of the country.
These forces received strong support, including arms, from 
the Soviet Union, while the United States was supplying 
arms to the Laotian government. This competition was 
approaching open conflict between the two powers, although 
Laos was not important enough to either of them to go to war. 
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev agreed during 
informal talks in Vienna in 1961 to neutralize Laos in order 
to avoid war without either yielding to the other. A 
fourteen-nation convention met at Geneva in 1962 to neutralize 
Laos. The International Control Commission, already estab­
lished by the Geneva Convention of 1954 on Indo-Chlna, was 
assigned the added function of observing the neutralization 
of Laos* Violations were to be handled by Britain and the 
Soviet Union, co-chairmen of the 1954 convention, who would 
reconvene that body to decide on appropriate action.
The neutralization agreement succeeded in preventing 
the imminent hostilities between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. However, it has never really accomplished 
the neutralization of Laos. Foreign troops have not been 
removed from Laotian territory, as required by the agreement. 
The International Control Commission often has not been 
permitted access to areas where violations were taking place, 
and the members of the commission have been unable to agree 
in interpreting their observations as to what constitutes a
12
violation. As explained later, this disagreement was a 
reflection of the Cold War since the commission consisted 
of members sympathetic to each side.
South Vietnam continues to support, with its military 
forces, the overthrow of the government of Laos, and to use 
Laotian territory for transportation of troops and supplies 
into South Vietnam, The United States, called in at the 
request of the government of Laos to observe violations, 
was eventually engaged in military operations in Laos both 
to protect its observation aircraft and to block the flow 
of North Vietnamese troops and supplies through Laos. With 
United States air support, South Vietnam invaded Laos in 
1971* The Soviet Union and China provide military supplies 
to support North Vietnamese military operations in Laos.
A further complication in Laos comes from the internal 
political situation there. Before Laos could be neutralized, 
it was necessary to establish a Laotian government which would 
adopt a policy of neutrality. This was achieved when the 
three major contending factions Joined to form a coalition 
government and chose as Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who 
has attempted to follow a neutral policy. The coalition 
government has not been effective, and the Prime Minister 
has not been able to achieve any control over nearly half 
of the country which is under communist Pathet Lao and North 
Vietnamese control. it is clear that Laos has never been
• tv ' '
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neutralized in fact, although legally the agreement still 
stands.
The most recent case of neutralization in Europe is 
Austria.^ In 195^ Austria and Germany were still under 
occupation forces left over from World War'll. These forces 
were being supplied by the Soviet Union, the United States, 
Prance and Britain. The Soviet Union and the other three 
powers had been unable to agree on peace treaties for those 
nations. In 1955 Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
proposed that each of the two occupied countries be 
neutralized and united, thereby removing Western and Soviet 
military forces. At first, the Western nations did not 
respond, believing that the Soviet proposal would prevent 
Germany and Austria from Joining NATO. They also saw this 
proposal as a stratagem of the Soviet Union by which Germany 
and Austria would be taken under communist control following 
the examples of the eastern European nations. Austria 
agreed, in hopes that it would thereby be freed of all 
occupation forces and regain its independence. Austria 
declared its permanent neutrality. The Soviet Union there­
upon signed a peace treaty with Austria, removed its troops, 
and agreed to participate in a four-power guarantee of 
Austrian neutrality. The other three occupation powers
11Blaoic, pp. 27-29.
Lyon, Neutralism, 'pp.■ 164-176.
Alfred Verdoss, “Austria^ Permanent Neutrality and 
the United Nations Organization1*. American Journal 
of International Law, 1956, pp. 61-68 and editorial 
comment by J.L.Kunz, pp. 418-425*
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agreed only to the extent of informing Austria that they
recognize its neutrality, but they have not made any
commitment to guarantee that status. Subsequently, those
four nations have respected Austrian neutralization. Most
other nations of the world have followed suit by informing
Austria of their intentions to observe Its neutrality.
Austria continues to have that status today.
There have been a number of other examples with some
features of neutralization. Cracow, a city state, was
neutralized in 1815 by Austria, Prussia and Russia. One
term of the treaty closed the city to refugees, giving
Austria and Russia Justification to invade it in 1846, when
Cracow refused to return political refugees. Soon after,
12it was annexed by Austria.
A case of neutrality imposed by a single external
nation is Finland, neutralized by the Soviet Union in 1948.
The Soviet Union agreed by treaty to permit and defend
Finland^ independence, and Finland agreed to remain outside
the conflict of interests of the great powers. This was to
Include resistance by Finland against Germany or any German
ally attempting to invade the Soviet Union through Finland.
There was no recognition of Finland*s neutrality by other 
13
major nations. Finland has maintained its independence and 
neutrality, but has occasionally been subjected to some 
pressure from the Soviet Union to cooperate in Soviet defense
^Wicker, pp. 20-23. 
^I^ron, Neutralism, p. 97*
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and to form governments acceptable to the Soviet Union.
One could also include cases of imposed neutrality 
involving areas at sea, the Antarctic, and neutral zones 
within or between countries, although they do not provide 
for independence of the neutral territory.
These examples and precedents might suggest ways by 
which the problem of Israel can be solved. That problem 
Is explained in detail in the last chapter.
Briefly, Israel has become a focus of conflict between 
the big powers. Britain and France were directly involved 
in Israel and the Middle East when they colonized the area, 
and were engaged In warfare there as recently as 195& when 
they participated in the Israeli invasion of Egypt. Britain 
and France are less involved there now than they were, but 
the United States and the Soviet Union have now developed 
a serious rivalry in the Middle East which could result In 
warfare between them. Isreal*s very existence is threatened 
by hostile neighbors. Therefore, Israel can be considered 
another candidate for neutralization, to be removed like 
Laos or Austria from the arena of Cold War conflict, and 
protected by international guarantees.
CHAPTER II 
NEUTRALIZATION AS A STATUS
In this chapter, neutralization will be discussed 
as a status, and in the next, as a process* The Inquiry 
Into neutralization as a status will begin with an 
investigation of the elements needed to establish that 
status, followed by those, elements needed to maintain it. 
These elements will be illustrated by historical examples.
16
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PARTICIPATING NATIONS
In establishing the neutralization of a nation, 
actions are normally taken by both the nation to be 
neutralized and the external nations which are agreeing to 
neutralize It. How many nations should be included and 
which nations should they be? Many such external nations 
may be Involved in these actions, and the neutralization 
of Laos provides a good example of many nations participating 
for a variety of reasons.
The agreement for Laos was proposed by the two major 
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to 
avoid their Increased and dangerous Involvement there.
Twelve other nations (including Laos, itself) Joined in the 
negotiations, and the agreement was complete when all of 
them had concurred. The United Kingdom participated as a 
major power with general Interests in the area, but the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were also obligated to 
participate because their foreign secretaries had been co- 
chairmen of the Geneva Convention of 195^ and retained 
responsibilities of supervising the implementation of that 
treaty.
France, although distant, had strong national 
Interests there which had continued since the days when 
Laos was a French colony. India, Canada and Poland had 
obligations to provide members for an International Control 
Commission to observe violations of the Geneva Convention 
of 195** • Cambodia, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Thailand 
were included as close neighbors whose national security was 
affected by conditions In Laos. Cambodia was particularly 
Interested in preserving its own neutral status. The fact 
that neighboring North Vietnam and South Vietnam were engaged 
in war meant that neutralization of Laos would have to 
include attention by those nations to keep the war out of 
Laos. North Vietnam had troops fighting in Laos which would 
have to be withdrawn. Communist China completes the roster 
of participants, joining because of strong interests there 
and a desire to remove foreign powers from an area which It 
considers to be within its sphere of Influence. China shares 
a border with Laos and is therefore a constant threat to Laos.
It is not always necessary for so many nations to 
participate. Most other cases have Involved only a few 
nations in formal negotiations, although subsequently others 
may have given formal or informal recognition of the agreement. 
For example, Austrian neutralization came about through a 
series of agreements between Austria and the four powers 
with occupation forces there. Other nations later recognized
19
Austria's permanent neutrality, and by 1968 the number
Xkhad reached sixty-two nations.
Nineteenth century cases of neutralization were 
negotiated by the major powers of Europe, to settle the 
rivalries among them. They were initiated by Great Britain, 
France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, the nations which 
played the major role in maintaining the European balance 
of power. Additional European nations joined in some cases. 
It was those five nations which formally established and 
guaranteed Swiss neutrality at Paris in 1815, although Spain, 
Portugal ana Holland also had agreed at preliminary 
negotiations earlier that year. Belgian neutralization was 
established by those five nations at London in 1831, and the 
guarantee was renewed by them with the addition of Holland 
In 1839. Those same five nations, along with Holland, 
Luxembourg and Italy neutralized Luxembourg at London in 
186?. Belgium was also represented at the conference but 
did not sign the treaty since the obligation to defend 
Luxembourg would have been a violation of Belgian neutrality, 
as I will explain later. Luxembourg retained ties with 
Holland, sharing a monarch, King William, until 1890. In 
View of this tie, one might question whether Luxembourg was 
really neutralized with respect to Holland. However, the 
emphasis was on the major powers and their obligation to
^Austrian People's Party Newspaper, Volksblatt, 
according to New York Times. Sept.21, 1963, p. 4.
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refrain from imposing their rule over the neutralized 
state. Relations between relatively small nations and the 
neutralized nations were of minor importance.^
In view of this fact, why was it considered necessary 
to include so many smaller nations in the Laotian treaty?
The reason was that in the case of Laos, the major powers 
did not have the control over the smaller Asian nations 
that the five big powers had over the smaller nations in 
nineteenth century Europe. Furthermore, distances to Laos 
are much greater than within Europe, and the international 
and internal situations more unstable there. Withdrawal of 
the great powers from Laos was likely to leave a power 
vacuum into which these other nations might enter. Violation 
of Laotian neutrality would not be so great an upset to the 
balance of power between the big powers as an invasion of 
Belgium or Switzerland would have been. All of these 
reasons indicate that small nations were much more likely 
to destroy the neutrality of Laos than of Belgium,
Luxembourg or Switzerland; and for that reason, they were 
included in the neutralization negotiations.
In summary, the participating nations consist of those 
which have an interest in or are capable of disrupting 
neutralization. They may be grouped into five categories:
(1) the neutralized nation, (2) major powers, (3 ) neighbors, 
(H) neutrals for enforcing purposes, if necessary, and 
(5 ) other minor nations which might have interests there.
^Lauterpacht, Vol. II, pp. 246—2^8.
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The interested minor nations need not always participate 
directly in the negotiations; but if they do not, they 
should either declare their consent, or be under the control 
of other participants who can keep them from disrupting the 
situation.
Having determined which nations would participate, 
let us see what actions they would take to establish a status 
of neutralization. They must first agree to the neutrality 
and then implement the terms of their agreement. It is most 
convenient to examine the actions taken by the erternal 
nations first, and then those taken by the nation being 
neutralized. Finally, there are other actions taken Jointly. 
This discussion will focus on the initial, measures to be 
taken, keeping in mind that other measures needed to maintain 
neutralization after it is established will be presented 
later.
22
EXTERNAL ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION
The agreement negotiated by the external nations can 
be a formal treaty, or it can be quite informal, as when 
officials with authority simply make it known that their 
governments intend to respect a nation*s neutrality.
The formal procedure was used in the nineteenth century 
cases in Europe. Although the members of the Congress of 
Vienna had already agreed by a declaration to neutralize 
Switzerland, they formalized this agreement a few months 
later by including it in the Act of Paris. Similarly, the 
neutralization of Belgium was a part of the Treaty of London 
of 1831, and again formalized eight years later at the time 
that it was Implemented. Luxembourg was formally neutralized 
according to terms of the Treaty of London of 1867. Likewise, 
the neutralization of Laos in this century came about by the 
detailed formal treaty signed at Geneva in 1962.
An erample of less formality is the accumulation of 
statements which neutralized Austria. Neutrality was imposed 
by the Moscow Declaration of April 15, 195'5» which contained 
concessions by Austria as conditions to a peace treaty with 
the Soviet Union. The subsequent peace treaty with all four
23
occupation powers contains no references to neutrality.
Neutrality was recognized instead by official statements of
policy from those governments to the government of Austria.
These neutralization agreements vary in their contents
and their degree of detail. According to definition used in
this paper, the agreement Imposes permanent neutrality. The
nineteenth century agreements hardly went beyond a general
statement to that effect. For example, the agreement for
Switzerland simply declared that the treaty powers recognize
the “formal and authentic acknowledgement of the perpetual
neutrality of Switzerland; and...guarantee that country the
integrity and inviolability of its territory'*.
The terms for Austrian neutralization in the Moscow
Memorandum of April 15, 1955, were likewise brief. That
agreement provided: (l) a neutral Austria on the model of
Switzerland; (2) that the Austrian Parliament would agree
to a status of permanent neutrality for the country; (3) that
Austria would obtain international recognition of the neutral
status; and (4) that the four occupying powers would be
requested to guarantee the inviolability and Integrity of
16
Austrian territory. American, British and French state­
ments recognizing Austrian neutrality were identical notes 
replying to an Austrian request that those nations should
■^J. L. Kunz, “Austria's Permanent Neutrality",
American Journal of International haw, 1956, p. 420.
Zh
recognize its permanent neutrality. Those notes stated
simply that the government of each of those nations Mhas
taken cognizance of this constitutional law (by which Austria
had declared Its policy of permanent neutrality) and
recognizes the permanent neutrality of Austria as defined 
17
therein11. The Soviet Union also submitted an identical 
note, giving the appearance that permanent neutrality was 
being initiated by Austria instead of having been imposed
n O
by the Soviet Union.
The American position has been clarified in a memoran­
dum on “The Nature of Austria^ Neutrality and Legal 
Implication of United States Response to the Neutrality 
Declaration11, dated November 16, 1955, by the office of the
19
Legal Advisor of the Department of State. It explained 
that the note to Austria meant that the United States was 
only declaring that as a matter of policy it would not 
violate Austrian neutrality, but was making no commitment 
to defend it.
The Declaration of Neutrality of Laos was the most 
detailed of all. It contained a list of actions to be met
17
'Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19, 1955, P* 1012.
Sven Allard, Russia And The Austrian State Treaty» 
.(University Park: Penn State U. Press, 19.70')", p. 225* 
*”u. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Neutrallza.tlon In Southeast Asia (w as hi ng to n:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 23.
Tby the participating nations.^ The thirteen external 
nations agreed:
-  to respect the Independence and neutrality of Laos;
- not to act to Impair that Independence and neutrality 
to do nothing to threaten that condition;
- not to Interfere in the Internal affairs of Laos;
- to attach no strings to aid given to Laos;
- to engage in no military alliance which would be
inconsistent with the neutrality of Laos;
- not to employ SEATO to protect Laos;
- to remove all foreign troops (with minor exceptions);
- not to use Laotian territory for the purpose of
interfering with other countries;
- not to use the territory of other countries for
the purpose of interfering with Laos.
Each nation appealed to the others to respect Laotian 
neutrality and, in case of violation, agreed to consult with 
Laos. A protocol to the agreement added details about such 
things as the date of withdrawals, their routes, and means 
of enforcement.
Appendix A is a model treaty proposed by four Princeton 
University professors engaged by the U. S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee to make a study of neutralization for
20The Declaration and Protocol on Laos, in Current 
History. Oct. 1962, p. 234; also in Black, 
pp. 175-184.
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possible application in Southeast Asia. It is patterned 
on the Laos agreement, improved by lessons learned from its 
failures. It can be used, along with historical examples, 
as a Bource for a suggested treaty for Israel.
21Black, pp. 191-195-
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EXTERNAL a c t i o n s  to i m p l e m e n t n e u t r a l i z a t i o n
These agreements may be sufficient to establish the 
legal basis for neutralization, but they must be followed, up 
by positive actions to implement them. Whatever acts 
prompted the agreement in the first place must be ended.
In all cases of neutralization except Laos, the 
initial implementation of the agreements has posed no 
particular problems. The nations simply removed their 
military forces, stopped contending over the neutralized 
nation, and permitted it to be neutral. The Laos case is 
unique in that some terms of the agreement were never carried 
out. The importance of taking various actions is illustrated 
by noting the consequences of violations. It will be seen 
that when neutralization is attempted in an unstable 
situation, enforcement measures may be necessary to insure 
initial compliance. What those enforcement measures might 
be will be described later, but the problems necessitating 
those measures are explained in the following paragraphs.
At the time of the Laotian agreement, North Vietnamese
22
troops were present throughout Laos. Some were fighting
^Dommen, pp. 223 ff• provides a detailed account of 
the events in Laos which follow.
28
with the Pathet Lao against the Royal Laotian government.
Some were occupying Laotian provinces along the North
Vietnamese border. Others were on the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
defending it or using it while enroute to South Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao controlled two-thirds of the territory of
Laos, and North Vietnamese military forces were taking
extensive measures to extend and firm Pathet Lao control
before the agreement, anticipating that their withdrawal.
would be required. The agreement was made in July, 1962,
and troops were to be withdrawn by October. In August,
American reconnaissance aircraft found a convoy of combat
troops with their equipment moving from North Vietnam into
the Plain of Jars in north central Laos and dispersing to
the south. Armed control posts were established along the
border at entry points into Vietnam and at several airfields
in Laos near these routes. The number of North Vietnamese
troops were thus increasing rather than decreasing at this
time. By the end of August, the British Foreign Office
estimated that 10,000 North Vietnamese troops were in Laos.
It is unknown how many of these forces withdrew in
accordance with the agreement, but many did remain. North
Vietnam reported in October that all their troops had been 
23removed, but many had simply shifted to civilian clothing
24
so that it could be claimed that they were non-military.
^ New York Times, Oct. 10, 1962.
2^Tliae. Oct. 12, 1962, p. 32.
The International Control Commission was able to verify
25
the departure of only forty of these 10,000 troops.
Reports of North Vietnamese military activity in Laos
continued, and in December the United States expressed
26
concern over the presence of North Vietnamese troops.
Some Pathet Lao troops were integrated into the Royal
Laotian armed forces as part of the coalition agreement.
American military forces consisted of 666 advisors 
„ 27
as of July, 1962. They were stationed with the Meo 
tribesmen in northeastern Laos, opposing the Pathet Lao, 
North Vietnamese, and Viet Cong. This aid was being given 
to support the governments of both Laos and South Vietnam. 
All of these forces were removed by the October, 1962 
deadline. The United States had also been supplying large 
quantities of both military and economic equipment. These 
American supplies were being airlifted by Air America, 
so-called non-military aircraft under contract with the 
United States government. Non-military aircraft were not 
excluded by the neutralization agreement, so long as they 
were not delivering military equipment. This airlift 
continued after October, 1962, in the form of food dropped 
to the Meo tribes, but delivery of military equipment was 
stopped.
^Dommen, p. 240; and New York Times, Nov.11, 1962, p. 
^^New York Times, Dec. 14, 1962.
27Tlme, Oct. 12, 1962, p. 32.
A year earlier, American military aid on a much greater
level had been ready for use in Laos, reaching the point of
preparations for Invasion. It was prepared to support the
right wing government under Boun Oum who was in danger of
being overthrown by Soviet and North Vietnamese supported
communists. Marines had been embarked on board the ships
of the U. S. Seventh Fleet, and those ships had moved into
the South China Sea. Aircraft had been loaded with supplies
and prepared for bombing missions, and U; S. Marines had
landed in Thailand across the Mekong River from Vientiane.
These preparations for Invasions had been made to persuade
the Soviet Union to cooperate in neutralizing Laos. They
coincided with President Kennedy's announcement at a press
conference on March 15, 1961, that the United States “strongly
and unreservedly supported the goal of a truly neutral Laos".
He threatened that if the attacks by erternally supported
communist forces did not stop, those who did not support a
neutral Laos would have to bear the consequences. This threat
was instrumental in bringing about a cease fire in May and
international talks leading to the neutralization agreement.
These additional military forces were withdrawn after serving 
28that purpose.
28Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 3 6 6 ; 'and Time,
March 18, 1961, p. 8-10.
Before the agreement, the Soviet Union was providing
food, fuel, howitzers, mortars, and operators for military
equipment. This equipment was being airlifted from Hanoi
to the headquarters of a rival government in Khang Khay in
the Plain of Jars, communist Pathet Lao country. A coalition
government had been set up there, joining former neutralist
Souvanna Phouma with the Pathet Lao. Non-military transport
was used for this Soviet equipment. The flights continued
after the neutralization until November, 1964. Nine of the
Soviet transport aircraft were turned over to the government
of Laos in December, 1962, after the rival government was
disbanded, for use in airlifting government supplies to
troops and refugees in remote areas. During this period of
the first two years of Laotian neutrality, Laos was governed
by a coalition of factions, and both American and Soviet
airlifts were being used to support the policies of that
government. It was therefore not being used at that time
29
as a means of competition between these two powers.
There were also Chinese communist workers and technicians 
in Laos, who remained in Laos after the deadline for removal 
of troops. All French military personnel departed, with the 
exception of a few advisors who were permitted to remain, 
according to a special provision of the treaty, so long as 
their presence was desired by the Laotian government.
^Domrnen, pp. 233—2^.
Thus, in implementing the neutralization treaty, 
foreign military forces, except some authorized French 
troops, were reported to have been removed. However, 
some foreign military activity continued, Justified by 
identifying it as non-military or civilian. Foreign 
nations ceased overt interference, except for some inter­
vention requested by Laos to oppose intervention by other 
pations. Efforts were made by the external nations to 
give the appearance of complying with the neutralization 
agreement, and in most cases there was compliance with 
the letter of the agreement. Direct intervention in the 
affairs of Laos was reduced for a while.
33
INTERNAL ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION
The other half of the process of establishing a 
condition of neutralization is the part played by the 
nation being neutralized. It becomes permanently neutral. 
Normally, there is a declaration of a policy of permanent 
neutrality, followed by steps to put that policy into 
effect. Again let us see how this has been done in actual 
cases. These actions may be voluntary or imposed by the 
neutralizing nations.
Switzerland had already established a tradition of 
neutrality which had lasted for over a century when it was 
Interrupted by the European wars of 1798-1815. Neutralization 
helped Switzerland to restore that status. Switzerland 
asserted its neutrality willingly and in compliance with 
treaty requirements, and has voluntarily reaffirmed it on 
many occasions since. It has remained armed and has been 
prepared to defend its neutrality by force If necessary.
Luxembourg also officially declared a policy of 
neutrality, and even went so far as to Include a statement 
to that effect In its constitution. Borders were closed to 
foreign armies, and the country itself, Including Its great 
fortresses, was demilitarized in accordance with the treaty
3k
1867* Because of Its small size and lack of armed forces, 
there was little it could do to prevent Interference from 
outside, but it could and did insist on maintaining a 
neutral policy.
Belgium, on the other hand, did little to establish
its neutrality* It did desire independence as well as no
intervention from its more powerful neighbors. However, the
requirement to be neutral was Imposed without considering
the desires of Belgium, and the nation had no choice but to
comply. In this case, then, there was no positive action
but merely a passive compliance. Maintenance of the status
depended on the cooperation of the guaranteeing powers and
30ended when those powers came to blows.
Austrian neutralization was like that of Switzerland,
as stated in the Moscow Memorandum. A major step in the
process was the enactment by the Austrian Parliament of a
31
policy of permanent neutrality, to be guarded nby all 
means at its disposal11. The nation would engage in no 
policy leading to war Involvement, no offensive or defensive 
alliances, and acceptance of no military aid or bases.
Austria would not participate in guaranteeing the neutrality 
of any other state. No passage of troops through Austria 
would be permitted. Austria would go to war if attacked, 
to defend its neutral status. The Austrian government has
S.Senate Committee on Foreigh Relations, 
Neutralization In Southeast Asia, p . 20.
-^ Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 19,
1953, PP- 1011-1012.
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restated these principles on several occasions since, when 
threatened by military activity in neighboring countries. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the treaty, Austria sought 
and received international recognition of its neutral status.
Agreement by the fourteen nations to neutralization of
Laos was preceded by much effort within Laos to establish an
internal policy of neutrality. This Btarted with
negotiations between representatives of the three contending
factions: one communist, one anti-communist, and the third
desiring neutrality. They ultimately agreed to a cease fire,
formation of a coalition government, and a formal statement
of neutrality. This statement was presented to the other
thirteen nations and became the key part of the neutralization
agreement. The statement declared that Laos would engage in
friendly equal relations with foreign nations, protect its
Independence, not interfere with or use force in other
countries, not enter military alliances or permit foreign
military bases In Laos, not allow foreign interference in
Laos, and not permit foreign military personnel in Laos.
But it would accept economic aid and respect treaties not
32
interfering with Laotian neutrality.
The formation of a coalition government was faced with 
great obstacles, similar to those hindering an earlier 
coalition formed in response to the 195** Geneva Convention.
“^ Black, pp. 169-17**
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That convention stated that Laos was to establish a coalition 
government through elections to be held In 1955. General 
elections were held in December, 1955, hut the two provinces 
held by the communist Pathet Lao did not participate.
Prince Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister and proceeded 
with a program to comply with the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention. Efforts to induce the Pathet Lao to cooperate 
in joining a coalition government included visits by the 
Prime Minister to Peking, Moscow and Hanoi to get backing 
for a government which would include integration of the 
Pathet Lao and the two provinces which they controlled.
By 1957 the coalition government was set up and the communists 
were assigned the two key cabinet positions: Minister of 
Planning, and Mihlster of Reconstruction and Urbanization.
The Pathet Lao became legitimate by launching its political 
party, Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front). Supplementary 
elections were held In the former excluded provinces, and 
measures were started to Integrate the armies of the two 
factions.
These coalition efforts did not last long. The Neo 
Lao Hak Sat party directed its efforts to consolidating its 
gains so that, although the nation was united politically, 
the people in areas controlled by the Pathet Lao would remain 
under their control. Intense indoctrination was Instituted 
by the Pathet Lao there, and hostages taken from families 
to North Vietnam to Insure their loyalty. In 1958
37
the communist ministers were dismissed from the government, 
ending the coalition.
This failure to establish a neutral coalition govern­
ment showed that there were great obstacles to the success 
of such a government after the 1962 neutralization, although 
chances for success might be Improved if foreign interference 
were ended. In an effort to promote neutralization and to 
end conflict within the nation, leaders of rival factions 
met repeatedly In 1961. Finally, in June they agreed to 
form another coalition. This agreement was not to be 
Implemented until a year later. Since the leaders could 
not agree on the composition of the government, they agreed 
to ask the King to choose the members, and they agreed to 
abide by his decision. Normally, the King was a ceremonial 
figure remaining free from politics. However, his existence 
at this time provided a means, not available to most nations, 
of settling disputes.
To establish this three-faction coalition, Souvanna 
Phouma replaced U.S.-backed right-wing Boun Oura as Prime 
Minister in accordance with the King's decision. Neo Lao 
Hak Sat leaders Souphanouvong and Vongvichit were assigned 
cabinet posts of Minister of Economy and Planning and 
Minister of Information and Tourism, respectively. The 
framework of a coalition government was thus provided.
However, as we shall see later, the factions were too 
divided to be effective. The Prime Minister was unable
38
to get support of either the right or left wings of the 
coalition.
Austria also formed a coalition government at the time
33of Its neutralization. The major purpose of the coalition 
was to present a unanimous acceptance of neutrality and the 
other conditions of the State Treaty of Austria by which 
foreign occupation troops were removed. This was a coalition 
between the two major parties: the conservative People1s 
Party and the Socialist Party. Both joined in negotiations 
with the Soviet Union and accepted the terms of the Moscow 
Declaration of 1955- This coalition did not have the 
friction which Laos had because the parties were not so 
Ideologically opposed and the communist party was not 
represented. It lasted until 1966 when the People's Party 
won an absolute majority In the parliamentary election and 
set up a conservative government, causing no problem so far 
as the neutrality policy was concerned. Thus, it can be seen 
that a coalition government is not a prerequisite for 
neutralization so long as all major factions support the 
policy.
33Allard, p. 225*
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JOINT ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH NEUTRALIZATION
These actions, required independently by external 
powers and the nation being neutralized, do not take into 
account the fact that some joint actions are required by 
both parties. Military treaties, especially mutual security 
pacts, are inconsistent with neutralization since the 
neutralized nation cannot fulfill its obligations. Therefore, 
these pacts must be cancelled. Not only must foreign 
military forces leave the territory of the neutralized state, 
but military aid cannot be accepted nor requested from a 
major power. The Laotian neutralization treaty directed 
withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Laos, with 
the exception of the temporarily continued presence of a few 
French forces. The breakdown of Laotian neutralization has 
Involved a combination of the refusal of North Vietnam to 
withdraw its forces, and the consequent granting of American 
military support at the request of the Laotian government.
Not only must these military relations be curtailed, but 
there may have to be some restrictions on other joint 
actions. Warfare is not Just a matter of military activity; 
there is also economic, psychological and political warfare, 
but treaties have been vague with respect to these other 
types of warfare.
ko
As I have stated, the implementation of neutralization 
requires that the nation stop doing whatever led to the 
conflict in the first place. Normally, it is not military 
but economic, psychological and political actions which 
di»aw nations into warfare. Such non-military but unfriendly 
actions are the substance of the Cold War, and neutralization 
includes imposing permanent neutralism with respect to the 
Cold War. It would thus seem to be logical that a 
neutralization agreement should include requirements to 
break economic, psychological or political ties and commit­
ments between Cold War powers and the neutralized nation.
These requirements have been omitted because of practical 
considerations. Most of these ties simply cannot be broken.
No neutralized nation can be completely self-sufficient, and 
the external nations would not be willing to cease all 
economic, political and psychological pressures on the 
neutralized country. For example, nations depend upon one 
another for trade and foreign investments. Tourism, news 
reporting, literature and many other forms of interrelations 
form ties by which nations Influence one another.
In practice, there have been some efforts to carry 
neutralization beyond the military sphere, but they have 
been limited. An example is the Swiss decision not to Join 
the United Nations because of the obligation for members to
3^
Join in U.N.-Imposed sanctions against violators of the charter.
^Black, pp. 12-15, 51-59-
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Austria has Ignored this complication and Joined that 
organization* Neither has requested membership in the 
European Economic Community or NATO because these two 
organizations are seen by the Soviet Union and East Europe 
as being directed against the communist bloc, and therefore 
not neutralist. Switzerland did Join the League of Nations, 
but with special provisions to excuse it from applying 
sanctions against offenders. Recently the E.E.C, has been 
working on .modifying its political goals in order that 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland might be able to have full 
membership without violation of their policies of neutrality,^ 
These restrictions generally have been ignored in the formal 
neutralization treaties because of the difficulty of carrying 
them out. An exception was the Laotian agreement which said 
that no conditions of a political nature could be attached 
to any assistance offered to Laos. The Princeton study 
model treaty has a proposed provision which would erempt a 
neutralized member of the United Nations from participating 
in not only military but economic and political sanctions 
against other members.
More problems may be created by stopping economic ties 
than continuing them* Laos provides an extreme eTample.
•^Willy Zeller, ”The Neutrals and European Integration11, 
.Swiss Review of World Affairs, Dec, 1970, p. ?•
^ Black, p. 194.
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Once economic aid was started and Laos came to depend upon 
it, its cut-off had greater effects than continuing to 
provide it. The cut-off of economic relations can be a 
severe form of sanctions, and is a measure provided in the 
U.N. Charter to be used against offenders. The American 
pressure which contributed to the break-up of the coalition 
government in 1958 was the temporary halt of U.S. aid to 
Laos, thus preventing the communist members of the cabinet 
from delivering it to the Pathet Lao. On the other hand, 
after neutralization, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union continued economic aid but on a reduced scale. In 
fact, the continuance of this aid was used by both the United 
States and the Soviet Union to persuade the factions which 
each supported to cooperate in a cease fire and in the 
neutralization negotiations.
For similar reasons, there is no need to curtail normal 
trade relations, even though these relations are bound to 
lead to trade commitments in the form of contracts, loans, 
and long term agreements to import or export certain items.
All nations depend on one another economically for certain 
things which they need. Also, a requirement to end foreign 
investments in the neutralized country would be unreasonable. 
All parties to a neutralization should attempt to be impartial 
and try to avoid economic ties which would have to be pro­
tected in time of war, but It is usually not practical to 
spell out these terms in a treaty. Some problems which can
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result from attempts to limit economic ties will be
discussed further in the nert chapter about objectives
and results of neutralization.
The same principles apply to other areas. Article 435
of the Treaty of Versailles contains a definition of the
rights and duties involved in “permanent neutrality11,
patterned on the experiences of Switzerland. It states that
the neutral state is not bound to observe-an “ideological
neutrality", and that consequently it could allow political
37rights such as free speech and press. There is therefore 
nothing to prevent the use of propaganda in a way that would 
be against the spirit of neutrality, either by external 
states or the neutralized state.
37Verdoss, p. 66
EXTERNAL ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION
Once these Initial actions are taken to establish 
neutralization, they are followed by actions to maintain 
that status. The maintenance of neutralization first 
requires the continuation of those measures taken to 
establish neutralization in the first place. Additional 
measures may be required to prevent or stop violations.
It may be that the status is automatically continued 
because it contributes to the international balance of 
power, or it is in the Interest of each nation to continue 
it. Whatever conditions prompted the nations to agree to 
the status might also provide sufficient incentive for them 
to abide by that agreement. But the world situation changes 
and it is useful to have an understanding as to actions 
which those nations wishing to continue the arrangement 
may take in the event other nations decide to violate it. 
These enforcement actions can be quite delicate, since 
unless they are administered Impartially, the enforcement 
actions may themselves constitute a violation of the 
neutralization agreement.
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OBSERVATION
Logically, enforcement measures would start with a 
way of detecting Violations. Ideally, this would be done 
by representatives of nations or organizations having no 
direct interest there, since interested parties would be 
likely to be prejudiced. Also needed is an arbitration 
body to settle disputes over whether violations have 
occurred, especially when one interested nation blames 
another for the violations. Finally, when it is determined 
that a violation has occurred, sanctions or the threat of 
sanctions may be required to stop the violation and to 
restore neutralization.
The Laos example provided for observation of violations 
but was vague about what was to be done about them. The 
observation task was given to the International Control 
Commission. This team had been established originally by 
the earlier G-eneva Convention of 1954 to supervise implemen­
tation of the cease fire and the establishment of independence 
of the new nations formed from French Indochina. Members of 
this team were provided by Canada (anti—communist), Poland 
(communist), and India (neutral). This team was thus a 
coalition of Interests, similar to the coalition government
of Laos, representing each extreme and a neutral. The 
neutralization agreement of 1962 gave that commission the 
task of observing violations of that treaty as well. 
Violations were to be reported to the Soviet Union and 
United Kingdom, co-chairmen of the 195^ convention, who 
would then take corrective action or call the convention 
of nations which had participated in the 1962 agreement to 
decide on appropriate action.
In practice, the International Control Commission has 
never been effective. The Soviet Union insisted in .196-3 
that in most matters of Importance, the three representatives 
on the commission must agree unanimously before submitting 
recommendations or taking other action, and of course it 
was difficult to act on conflicting reports anyway. Poland 
used Its veto power frequently to avoid investigating or 
reporting suspected violations by North Vietnam. Since the 
I.C.C. was created in 195^, communist forces permitted very 
little observation in those areas under their control.
When observation was permitted, careful preparations were 
made to prevent their seeing incriminating evidence. After 
repeated failure of the I.C.C. to perform its functions, the 
government of Laos finally requested American reconnaissance 
aircraft to observe North Vietnamese activity in Laos, and 
accordingly they were provided. When these aircraft were 
fired upon, military escorts were provided. The military
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escorts eventually attacked anti-aircraft sites which were 
firing at them, and so one violation led to another.^
Laos has been the only state whose neutralization 
was observed by a neutral team. In other cases, it has 
been assumed that the neutralized government or the major 
powers which had made the agreement could perform this 
function. Luxembourg and Belgium are small enough that 
violations would be visible. Furthermore, in those countries 
the governments had control so that there would be no 
problem conducting their own Investigations. Laos did not
have this control over the communist territory. Laos was
also unique In that the initial removal of foreign troops 
was never completed. Had this been done, and Laos gained 
control of its borders, violations would not have been so 
difficult to detect. So it would seem that the failure of 
the International Control Commission was not so much the 
fault of the commission or of the treaty provisions which 
provided for it, as it was the fault of neighboring North 
Vietnam to implement the treaty in the first place, and of 
the Laotian government to establish authority over its 
entire territory.
Our historical examples do not give much useful 
precedent for observation procedures. In only one case was 
machinery set up to do this, and in that case it failed.
The failure provides lessons as to problems to be overcome,
*^Dommen, pp. 240-258*
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but does not help much in constructing a model for future 
cases. A logical approach to the subject would be more 
productive. The observation team is basically looking for 
instances in which the neutralized nation fails to follow 
a neutral policy. It is also looking for actions by external 
nations Interfering in the affAirs of the neutralized nation. 
In the first type of observations, violations should be quite 
obvious. Hostile actions against another state would 
certainly be detected by the victim state. Hostile threats . 
would also be obvious. Secret preparations for hostilities, 
on the other hand, would be difficult to detect even by an 
observation team. Obviously, the host government will not 
voluntarily permit any outside team to observe these 
activities. Refusal of the host to permit the observation 
team to have free access could be an indication of possible 
violations, but this is not a fair conclusion since all 
nations need to have some secrets to provide for their 
national security. It would thus seem that observation 
teams are not very effective for detecting violations by 
the neutralized country, since in order to detect violations 
which are not already visible, the team would have to be 
given powers which infringe upon the sovereignty of the 
nation under observation to such an extent that no nation 
would voluntarily consent.
The observation team would also be looking for 
violations committed by other nations. Certainly any state
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should be able to detect such activity within its borders 
through its own police and military forces as easily as an 
observation team could. Laos is exceptional in that it did 
not have effective control over Its territory, and the I.C.C. 
was being called upon to perform a function which in normal 
cases the government could do for itself. The observation 
team might also be expected to observe preparations for 
violation In neighboring states; for example, massing of 
troops and equipment in preparation for Invasion. Again it 
is doubtful that the nation concerned would permit 
observation if it wished to keep such preparations secret.
Observation teams therefore are not effective for 
detecting violations, but they can be used to investigate 
reported or suspected violations and particularly to verify 
that an alleged violation did not take place. Minor or un­
intentional violations could be investigated before they 
caused retaliation and grew into problems. Misunderstandings 
oould be clarified when the facts were brought into the open 
and explained by objective outsiders. These.activities by 
the observation team would provide some reassurance to each 
nation that other nations were not cheating. It is 
particularly important that the team be Impartial.
While the Laos treaty did provide for means of 
observation, it was vague as to measures to be taken once 
the violations were detected. The Soviet Union and Britain 
have never been able to agree to convene the treaty members.
The Soviet Union would not agree to a convention to act on 
charges of communist violations until anti-communist 
violations Ceased, and Britain followed the same policy 
when anti-communist violations were reported. No other 
action was authorized by the treaty. Consequently, enforce­
ment actions consisted of loud protests, along with un­
authorized actions by Individual members in order to 
investigate and stop violations by others.
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ENFORCEMENT
Although earlier neutralization cases were silent 
about observation or enforcement action, some principles 
for enforcement action did evolve over the years. In the 
absence of impartial International organization to provide 
observation teams or police forces, the neutralizing nations 
themselves acted also as the guaranteeing nations. It was 
not clear whether all nations which had originally agreed 
were to act jointly or whether they could act separately.
The generally accepted policy was that each participant In 
the agreement had an obligation to guarantee the continuation 
of neutralization, intervening individually to defend the 
neutralized state if there was no policy or agreement for 
Joint enforcement. However, it was never clearly understood 
Just how these obligations were to be carried out. In the 
case of Belgium, this was clarified somewhat by Great Britain 
when France and Prussia conspired in 1866 to have Belgium 
anneTed by France. Britain made separate treaties with 
France and Prussia that if either side violated Belgium* s 
neutrality, Britain would assist the other to defend it.
Great Britain thus adopted a policy for joint action,
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although France and Prussia still claimed that separate
39
action would be permissible. The treaty with France was 
implemented when Germany attacked Belgium in 1914. In the 
case of Luxembourg, the same question was debated but not 
decided.
It is obvious that joint action by nations representing 
both contending sides is a more effective way of maintaining 
neutralization; but when one of the major powers whose 
cooperation is needed to continue that condition fails to 
cooperate, the neutralization agreement in effect has been 
repudiated already. Action by one guaranteeing nation to 
restore neutralization may be possible if the offender is 
forced to agree, but this may Involve contradictions. 
Individual enforcement may serve to polarize the situation, 
adding to the differences which are breaking down the 
neutralized status. The contention may develop into War, 
fought over the neutralized country, making neutralization 
impossible. This situation is really no different from that 
in Laos where convention members are supposed to take joint 
action to restore neutralization but actually, because of 
their own Interests, have been acting Independently.
All of these examples imply that enforcement sanctions 
would be applied by the same nations which established the 
neutralization initially. Since they are all directly 
involved and would be judging themselves or each other,
•^Black, pp. 25-26, 35-37
their actions are not likely to be successful. Another 
solution would be to put enforcement Into the hands of an 
impartial International organization. The United Nations 
has attempted to perform this type of service. An example 
is the United Nations Emergency Force which observed the 
Israeli truce from 1956 until 1967. However, international 
teams of this nature have not had successful records because 
they have not had the strength or authority to take necessary 
action. For example, UNEF functioned until the truce was 
about to be violated. It was then asked to leave, did so, 
and was absent when its presence was most needed. Another 
problem Is that even the United Nations is not really Impartial, 
but reflects Cold War conflict, and any team provided by it 
might have the same problems interpreting their observations 
that the I.C.C. had in Laos.
Too much emphasis should not be put on the Importance 
of this enforcement machinery. It cannot take the place of 
a stable international system in which the interests of all 
participating nations are served by complying with the 
neutralization agreement. As I will explain later, an 
effective International balance of power system is far more 
likely to maintain neutralization than the most elaborate 
guarantees simply because International law has not developed 
to the point where they can be enforced. Peter Lyon claims 
that the "successful maintenance of neutralization depends
5^
upon the continuation of the balance of power which produced 
itB or on the “determination of the neutralized state to 
resist encroachment on its status1*. No treaties have 
attempted to prescribe what enforcement action should be 
taken. This has been left to be decided by the treaty 
participants when the occasion arises. Presumably, the 
neutralized nation should have a voice in this decision.
The Laos agreement specifically provided for Laos to be 
included.
^l^ron, Neutralism, p. 93»
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INTERNAL ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION
In view of these many problems which arise when 
external nations Intervene to enforce neutralization, 
maintaining that status may depend upon the efforts of the 
neutralized nation to preserve its own neutrality. It will 
be seen that the neutralized nation not only maintains a 
passive avoidance of big power politics, but on occasion 
may have to take positive actions to preserve its status.
This requires that the neutralized nation have a stable 
government which will not change its neutral policy. The 
government should also be strong enough to control any 
radical elements whose sympathies or connections with a 
foreign power might threaten to draw that faction or the 
whole nation Into controversies in which the power is engaged. 
There should be wide public support for the neutral policy, 
in spite of the sacrifices usually required. This internal 
support for the policy is probably even more Important than 
possession of power to resist foreign intervention. In fact, 
some neutralized nations have been denied this power by 
virtue of having been demilitarized. These statements will 
be explained further in the following paragraphs.
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Switzerland provides an excellent example of such
policies. The success of Swiss neutralization Is largely
due to Swiss internal policy as^well as the external balance
of power and guarantees. For example, in 1954 the Swiss
government took action to affirm its status by several self-
41
Imposed restrictions. Switzerland would abstain from
starting any war. It would defend its neutrality. It
would avoid involvement with other nations which might
lead to hostilities. Switzerland has continued to reject
membership in the United Nations as well as other collective
security treaties which would give Switzerland the obligation
to take sides against an aggressor nation, even though the
42
neutralizing nations would accept it into that body.
The ability and determination of the Swiss to defend
their neutrality was demonstrated in 1871 during the Franco—
Prussian War when the Swiss army disarmed 80,000 French
troops who had taken refuge there and Interned them until
43the end of the war. It has provided services for 
belligerents and rivals in peace time, but has taken pains 
not to become involved In actions which would favor either 
side.
Austria has made similar efforts to uphold its neutral 
status. During the Czech crisis of 1968, the Austrian
jfpBlack, PP • 22-23.
^lyon, Neutralism, p. 15^. 
^Lauterpaciit, Vol.II, p. 2^5*
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government became concerned that Soviet forces invading 
Czechoslovakia might violate Austrian territory. Austrian 
expressions of sympathy for their Czech neighbors appeared 
in the press and made Soviet officials concerned that Austria 
might be taking sides In that dispute. The Austrian government 
and political leaders took pains to call to the attention of 
the world the fact that Austria intended to preserve its 
neutrality. Chancellor Klaus pledged that the government 
would defend the status of permanent neutrality. Volksblatt, 
the newspaper of the majority Austrian political party 
(Peopled Party) appealed to the Soviet Union to respect that 
status. Later, President Jonas reaffirmed Austria's permanent 
neutrality, quoting the treaty provisions which obligated
44Austria to defend that neutrality "with all possible means11,
Belgium did little to preserve its neutrality, except
that In each war between neighboring nations, it took
45
military measures to defend Its territory. It was helpless 
anyway when Invaded by Germany in 1914.
The government of Laos has made many attempts to play 
the role of a neutral, but it has been difficult in view of 
the foreign troops on its territory, and the internal division 
of the country. In 196?, for example, Prime Minister Souvanna 
Phouma refused permission for American forces to come in and 
block the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but at the same time objected 
verbally to its use by North Vietnam.
New York Times, Sent.19, 1968, p. 13; Sept.21, 1968, 
..p. 4; Oct.6, 1968, p. 10; Oct. 27, 1968, p. 12. 
^Lauterpacht, Vol. I, p. 632.
It Is not enough that the neutralized nation do what 
it can to keep other nations from violating its status.
To get back to the basic definitions of neutralization, it 
is a matter of the neutralized nation permanently following 
a policy of avoiding hostile actions with other nations. It 
is therefore essential that its government consistently 
continue that policy despite differences between internal 
factions and changes of government. By definition, the 
whole arrangement collapses If the government rejects its 
obligations. The external powers can continue to refrain 
from Intervention, but the permanent neutrality will have 
ceased. Furthermore, If a faction rejecting neutrality 
comes into power, it probably means that it favors alliance 
with a major power, In which case the power concerned would 
most likely respond in kind. This is why attention was given 
to the establishment in Laos of a HneutralM government; that 
is, one which could he depended upon to declare and maintain 
a neutral policy. Little attention had been given to the 
governments of other neutralized nations, so long as they 
declared a neutral policy initially. Either It was assumed 
that the government would abide by its pledge, as in the 
case of Austria, or the external powers were in a position 
to see that the government remained neutral whether It 
wanted to or not, as in the case of Belgium.
It is interesting to note that there have been brief 
periods of internal crisis within Switzerland which have
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coincided with taik of intervention by neighboring powers.
For example, during the Swiss Civil War of 1847 reactionary
European powers were concerned that events in Switzerland
might encourage uprisings by liberal groups in their own
countries. The uprising was suppressed quickly by the
46government before Intervention could take place; but 
this incident shows that when a nation becomes divided, it 
does not take long for sympathies of other nations or of 
groups within them to be drawn to one or the other of the 
contending factions. This can easily lead to intervention 
either to assist the government to restore order, or to 
assist the rebels to set up a more favorable government,
A similar political division in Cracow during the 
same decade started events which led to intervention by 
Austria, Prussia and Russia to prevent revolutionary forces 
from establishing headquarters in Cracow as a threat to the 
governments of those three powers. This intervention led 
to the end of neutralization of Cracow a few years later.
Laos also is divided and therefore presents this 
problem. Neither the right-wing nor the left-wing factions 
support a policy of neutrality* Even if a centrist faction 
favoring neutrality were in power, both opposing factions 
factions would be continually acting to disrupt that policy; 
so it was decided that only a coalition government could 
be neutral. No international agreement was made until
46Heinz K. Meier, The United States and Switzerland
In The Nineteenth Century, iThe Hague: Mouton & Co.,
1963), ppV 26-28.
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leaders of the three factions promised to establish a 
coalition neutral government.
The Prime Minister organized and has made great efforts
to continue this coalition government, but he has been beset
with the same type of problems that took place in the attempt
to maintain the 195^ coalition government. The government
was too divided to function. After only three and one-half
months of Ineffective government, the Prime Minister was
given special powers to rule without requiring the confidence
of the National Assembly. He was thus enabled to ignore the
other two factions of the coalition government. NLHS
representatives quit the government in the spring of 1963.
In order to keep the form of a neutralist government,
Souvanna Phouma left these vacated positions open for their
return. Elections in 19^5 were boycotted by the NLHS on
47
the claim that they were illegal. Attempts to continue 
a neutral coalition government in Laos, although attempted 
in good faith, can be seen to be a farce for the purpose of 
governing the country. But the coalition did serve the 
initial purpose of enabling the Soviet Union and the United 
States to disengage in ' 19-62, and the pretense of continuing 
it has provided a deterrent to even greater foreign inter­
vention than has occurred. Laos still claims to be neutral­
ized and has a basis for objecting to foreign troops on its 
territory.
47Foreign Policy Association, ttWho Is The Adversary?11, 
Headline Series. April, 1968, p. 54.
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Despite these failures, one factor can be seen to 
have operated in favor of neutralization. A strong Prime 
Minister was able to provide stability in the government 
through his own continuation in power, whereas earlier in 
1958 a change in government had caused a rejection of 
neutralization efforts established by the Geneva Convention. 
Unfortunately, the prime Minister was handicapped by his 
inability to hold support of political rivals. Not only 
was the government unable to obtain support of the people 
in communist controlled provinces, but many Influential 
families In other provinces who opposed communist reforms 
put family loyalty ahead of national loyalty.
The case of Laos also illustrates that a coalition 
government composed of representatives from factions with 
Incompatible ideologies is not practicable. It Is Impossible 
for the government to make policy which would satisfy all 
factions, and each member continues to participate so long 
as it assumes that It can eventually dominate the government. 
A willingness to compromise and Join in a consensus is 
necessary to the success of any political system unless the 
dominant power is able to force submission of the opposing 
faction.
An alternative to a coalition government should be 
mentioned, which might function more effectively. That is 
a centrist government following a neutral policy which would 
exclude participation by radical factions. In fact, this is
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what the present government of Laos really is, since the 
centrist Prime Minister has been given sufficient power 
to ignore those who do not agree with him. There are 
obvious problems with this solution, too, since the 
government may not be able to satisfy or control dissenting 
groups. The radical Left claimed they had no representation 
in the Laotian government, and in effect seceded and Joined 
forces again with North Vietnam.
The above discussion illustrates the advantage of 
having a government in the neutralized nation to be not 
only neutral but also sufficiently strong and stable to 
prevent dissenting factions from upsetting the neutralization 
agreement. More generally, the political situation should be 
such that the government will not revise the policy of 
neutrality. Switzerland and Austria provide examples of the 
continued existence of such governments. In both of these 
countries political changes have not been great enough to 
threaten permanent neutrality.
This requirement for a strong government refers to 
strength to govern the domestic affairs of the country 
effectively. It does not imply a necessity for strong 
military power for its foreign relations. It might seem 
that such strength would be necessary, or at least preferable 
to reliance on the strength of other powers. In practice, 
neutralized nations have always been small nations not able 
to match the military strength of the neutralizing powers.
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Luxembourg maintained its neutrality for half a century as 
a tiny demilitarized nation, determined to retain Its 
neutrality and thereby Its independence.
Several points have been made In the preceding pages 
regarding actions which have been taken or attempted by the 
neutralized nations in order to maintain their status.
They may have to take positive steps to assert their 
neutrality when it Is threatened, and take further actions 
to defend it. They are expected not to have any commitments 
which would involve them in conflicts in foreign nations, 
and not take any aggressive actions. Their governments 
should be sufficiently stable and strong to continue the 
neutral policy and to suppress factions which might want 
to disrupt that policy.
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JOINT ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALIZATION
In separating for purposes of analysis the external 
and Internal neutralization actions, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that neutralization is largely a cooperative 
effort between all parties. Military alliances and other 
commitments once broken cannot be renewed. Generally, 
whatever acts have led to dangerous rivalry in the past 
should be avoided in the future. Actions to be avoided 
have been previously discussed, and this avoidance should 
be continued. Equally Important are positive attitudes 
and principles, to be developed. Little can be accomplished 
if it is based only on negative restrictions. A common 
understanding and mutual trust should be developed between 
all parties, between potentially rival external nations, 
and between the external nations and the neutralized nation. 
Methods to resolve arguments should be worked out without 
having to resort to outside enforcement machinery. These 
are matters to be accomplished through patient and 
cooperative diplomacy.
The neutralized nation should be impartial in its 
dealings with major powers. It should not try to play one 
against the other in order to obtain aid from both sides.
On the part of the major powers, there should he a 
willingness to avoid economic and psychological competition 
over the neutralized nation. There should be a sharing of 
resources obtained from It, and care should be taken not 
to dominate its economy through excessive foreign invest­
ments, nor to provide a monopoly market for its exports.
CHAPTER III 
NEUTRALIZATION AS A DEVICE
In the previous chapter I defined neutralization, 
and explained what actions are required to establish and 
maintain a status of neutralization. This background 
can be applied to Israel, to decide whether Israel could 
be neutralized, and how. But there is little point in 
making this application if we do not decide what purpose 
neutralization is designed to achieve and what other 
results there might be. Consequently, this chapter will 
investigate the purposes and results of neutralization,
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PURPOSES
According to most authorities, the purpose of 
neutralization Is to remove an area from strife between 
the great powers. In my introduction, I quoted Peter Lyon1s 
statement that neutralization is a “device...by which great 
powers...endeavor to remove small but strategically important 
territories outside the active sphere on international 
rivalries". Similarly, Black states that "its role is 
limited to the search for ways to remove minor states from 
arenas of destructive regional and global competition".
These statements of purpose are little more than elaborations 
on the definition of neutralization. They are worth noting 
for what they omit because one should not condemn neutralization 
for failing to accomplish something which it is not designed 
for. Neutralization is not necessarily supposed to put an 
end to strife in the neutralized area, nor between the great 
powers, but simply to keep such conflicts separated. Other 
additional desirable results are bonuses, but even the 
separation of conflicts would be a step toward order in 
international relations. Realistically, neutralization has
• Black, p. vl
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little chance of success where there is conflict; rather, 
it can be used best where conflicts have already been 
brought under control and a balance of power prevails.
The statements of purpose given above infer that
neutralization is used not only to keep the neutralized
nation out of war, but also out of peace time rivalries.
It therefore has some appeal for many neutralist or non-
aligned nations of the "Third World". For example,
Cecil V. Crabb explains that neutralist countries frequently
call upon both Cold War camps to respect the decision of
those countries to follow a neutralist course, and that
those countries which have had neutralization imposed upon
them (Austria and Laos) insist that the great powers abide
by the terras of their own agreements and cease endeavoring
to “align" such countries with their respective Cold War 
49systems. In most cases these nations prefer that the 
great powers simply recognize their neutrality rather than 
guarantee it because guaranteeing actions often take the 
form of intervention.
Neutralization may be described as a device for 
managing International power. As such, it supplements 
the balance of power system and contributes to International 
stability. However, nations are more interested in protecting 
their own interests than in building international order*
^Cecll V. Grabb, The Elephants and The Grass, 
(New York: Praeger, 1965T, "p." '93.
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In searching for practical purposes for neutralization, it 
is therefore more useful to investigate what it accomplishes 
from the points of view of the participating nations.
For the neutralized nation, it may he the means of 
obtaining or preserving its Independence, or it may be a 
means of preserving its territorial integrity. For Austria, 
it put an end to the four-power occupation which had 
continued since the end of World War II hostilities and 
provided Independence. Similarly, it was the only way that 
Luxembourg could have its independence established and 
guaranteed. For Switzerland, rather than ending occupation, 
It has prevented aggression. It was supposed to end 
occupation and prevent aggression in Laos but it failed.
Neutralization may serve the national Interests of 
the external powers. For the United States, Britain and 
France, it served the purpose of removing Soviet troops from 
Austria. It allowed the U.S.S.R. to remove troops from 
Austria for use elsewhere, without having to be concerned 
about Austria's coming under control of the United States 
and Western Europe. ^  It put a neutral wedge into NATO 
territory and created a buffer.
In Laos, the objective was similar for the major 
powers. It reduced the level of Intervention, thereby 
permitting each to reduce its own commitment. It also 
avoided conflict between those powers in behalf of interests
^°Blach, p. 27, PP- 112-113
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51which were not worth war,
A variation of these objectives is seen where the 
need to provide independence for the neutralized area does 
not exist. For example, the oceans are neutralized by inter­
national law, giving all nations free use of the seas. The 
uninhabited Antarctic continent was neutralized in 1959 "by 
the twelve nations participating in the International Geo­
physical Year where they agreed to use the continent only 
for peaceful purposes. In such cases, the purpose may be 
to avoid conflict by sharing the use of the area rather 
than by non-intervention. This might have an application 
in the Middle East where big power Interests are so strong.
For example, sharing the use of the Suez Canal, oil sources 
and pipelines would be a more practical solution than 
agreeing not to use them.
In Switzerland and Belgium in 1839, *&he objective was
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to prevent a renewal of French expansion. Later It provided 
protection against the threat to Western Europe of a new 
unified Germany. In these cases it served to create a 
buffer state between the great powers. Austria is another 
example of a buffer. Similarly, a neutral Laos would block 
communist expansion and the extension of Chinese power to 
Thailand, Cambodia and beyond. Seen from China, Laos would 
also be a buffer to American and other unfriendly interests 
toward Chinese territory.
•^Black, p. 59, PP* 112-114. 
Black, p. 59.
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In recent times, the ideological conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union complicates agreement on 
objectives. While both parties would agree on the advisability 
of agreeing not to fight over an area, there remains a 
difference in what each power hopes or assumes will happen 
In a neutralized state. According to the principle of peace­
ful coexistence, the Soviet Union would be likely to assume 
that there would be an evolution toward socialism and 
communism without the necessity of its intervention. After 
neutralization, Mr. Khrushchev bragged that Laos would fall 
to communism like a ripe apple.
On the other hand, the United States would be likely 
to assume that neutralization would provide an atmosphere 
favorable to a stable government and the status quo. 
Revolutionary movements would be seen by the United States 
as evidence of intervention by the Soviet Union, while 
opposition to such movements would be seen by the Soviet 
Union as intervention by the United States. Each would 
accuse the other of violating neutralization. Existing 
governments would appeal to the United States for protection, 
while revolutionary groups would appeal to the Soviet Union 
for backing. Under these circumstances, it would be most 
difficult for these two powers to refrain from taking sides 
and giving support to opposing factions. This Is why all 
the major factions in Austria and Laos agreed, rather than
•^Schleslnger, p. 334.
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only the official government, although this agreement 
quickly broke down in Laos. Other external powers would 
be likely to become Involved in the same way in this Cold 
War rivalry. For these reasons, one should take care not 
to view neutralization from only the perspective of anti­
communist interests and assume that communist Interests 
would take a similar view.
This ideological competition should not be exaggerated 
to the point of assuming that no agreement can be reached. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated 
In public statements that they are willing to cooperate — 
the Soviet Union in its calls for “peaceful coexistence11,
and the United States in President Nixon's “State of The
54
World1 message of February, 1970.
The Soviet attitude toward neutralization has been 
tied closely to its policy of peaceful coexistence. Austrian 
neutralization was advocated at the time that the peaceful 
coexistence policy was being launched. The Soviet Union 
argued that the neutralization of Austria would be a pre­
cedent to be followed throughout the Third World.
Neutral nations would thereby be joining the “peace camp“, 
breaking commitments to the Western nations. The “positive 
neutrality1 adopted by Egypt is an example of the result 
which was desired., Egypt renounced foreign influence and
•^Richard Nixon, U. S. Foreign Policy For The 197Qfs, 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Feb. 18, 1970), pp. 133-138.
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ties, but then accepted Soviet bloc trade. This explains 
why it was important to the Soviet Union that Austria 
should declare its permanent neutrality and request 
recognition by other nations. The Soviet Union could 
respond to this, rather than take the formal initiative.
It also explains why It was important to.the Soviet Union
55that the term “neutrality“ be associated with Austria.
It was not sufficient that other nations simply recognize 
Austrian IndependenceP which was accomplished through the 
acceptance of the State Treaty of Austria, but other nations 
should also recognize its neutrality.
The Soviet attitude toward neutralization is briefly 
summed up In the 1954 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclo­
pedia which stated that the Soviet Union “used the Insti­
tution of neutrality as a means of strengthening its own
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as well as the world's security".
The United States was generally skeptical of 
neutralization in the 1950rs and early i9601s for the same 
reasons it distrusted neutralism. It feared that those 
nations which did not take a stand against communist 
pressures would eventually succumb to them. Recently the 
United States has changed to a policy of tolerating neutralism 
and therefore might be more receptive to the idea of imposing 
it by neutralization.
^Allard, p. 225; Black, p. 10, pp. 45-47. 
Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 41-43.
The attitude of Communist China toward neutralization
can be seen in a study of Its attitude toward Third World
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nations from 1957 to i960, by A. M. Halpern. China strongly 
promoted the development of neutrality for the main purpose 
of opposing Western influence (called Imperialism in Chinese 
propaganda) in these nations. First, China encouraged 
nationalist feelings in those countries to reject foreign 
Influence, in the name of neutrality. Next followed an 
attempt to develop partnerships with the people of those 
countries to oppose Western influence. Yugoslavia was 
condemned because it used its neutralist policy to justify 
Independence from the communist countries instead of joining 
with China and Third World powers against Western imperialism. 
Likewise, China attempted to justify support of North Viet­
namese military intervention in Laos in the name of neutrality, 
although it was designed to remove opposition to communism 
there.
This concept of neutralization is similar to the way 
the term is used in military operations. Neutralization in 
a military sense refers to removing all opposition, rather 
than establishing a neutral situation. In the political 
competition of the Cold War, neutralization can easily 
take on that meaning, although the major powers concerned 
may claim to be setting up a truly neutral situation.
^A.M. Halpern, The Chinese Communist Line On
Neutralism, Publication P—2026, {3anta .Monica. ^
Math Division, The RAND Corporation, July 1, i960)
(also published In China Quarterly, Jan.-March,
1961), pp. 90-115.
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ACHIEVEMENTS AND RESULTS
Having stated what the objectives of neutralization 
are, let us see how well they have been achieved and what 
other effects have come from it.
In some cases, neutrality was maintained permanently 
or for a long period of time. Switzerland maintained its 
neutrality through the revolutions of 1830 and 1847-1850, 
and the wars of 1870-1871, 1914-1918, and 1939-1945.
Similarly, Belgian neutrality lasted from 1831 until 1914, 
surviving through several wars. A neutralist position has 
been maintained by Austria and Switzerland through the 
strains of the Cold War. The strains on Austria were 
particularly great during Soviet military intervention 
in neighboring Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and NATO military 
exercises in neighboring countries to the west.
The results of Austrian neutralization may be seen 
more clearly by comparing them with development in Germany. 
Austria and Germany were in similar circumstances after 
World War II, both being divided and occupied by the big 
four powers. Austria remains outside of the Cold War conflicts 
while Germany continues to be divided and a source of friction 
between the major powers.
On the negative side, neutralization has ended in 
various ways. In Belgium and Luxembourg, it ended when 
Germany, one of the guaranteeing powers, deliberately 
violated it, invading those countries In 1914. France and. 
Great Britain attempted to stop this violation by coming 
to their defense, and World War I followed. So, while 
neutralization kept Belgium and Luxembourg out of military 
conflict for many years, it also eventually contributed to 
war on a large scale. When one guarantor nation is deter­
mined to violate neutrality and others desire to enforce 
it, war is very likely to follow. On the other hand, in 
1914 the final outcome was the defeat of the violator.
The city-state of Cracow was neutralized by a treaty 
of 1815 but it was unable to survive the pressures of war 
between neighboring powers. The treaty had provided for 
the closing of Cracow to refugees. Subsequently, it was 
entered by both Austria and Russia to retrieve political 
refugees and then annexed by Austria in 1846. Again this 
shows how enforcement measures can result in increased 
chances of war because they justify the very Intervention 
that neutralization is supposed to prevent.
Whether Laos is still neutralized Is debatable. 
Officially, the agreement is still in effect, but it is 
being violated regularly by participating states. The 
government of Laos has maintained a neutralist position 
but has never gained control of the leftist Bathet Lao.
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' The agreement does appear to have reduced military inter­
vention by outside nations, especially the Soviet Union 
and the United States, but not by North Vietnam. Without 
neutralization the situation in Laos probably would have 
followed a course more like developments in South Vietnam. 
Neutralization did continue to hinder increased and more 
open Involvement In Laos by the major powers but has not 
prevented it.
In those cases where neutralization has survived, It 
has had effects other than those which were the main 
objectives sought. Neutralization has brought economic 
and other incidental benefits to Switzerland. Bankers the 
world over have a confidence that Switzerland will remain 
neutral while their own countries are engaged in coups and 
wars. Consequently, Switzerland has become a world banking 
center. Switzerland^ reputation as a neutral has also made 
It a first choice where nations mav meet to negotiate 
treaties. Geneva has become almost a world capital because 
of its frequent use as a diplomatic convention center, 
bringing money and prestige to Switzerland.
On the other hand, neutralization is sometimes an 
economic handicap. It can mean that the neutralized nation 
is not permitted to join economic pacts. For example, the 
Soviet Union objects to Austria*s' Joining the European 
Economic Community since it sees that organization as being 
directed against the economics of the nations of Eastern
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Europe and the Soviet Union. Switzerland likewise Is fore­
going the advantages of E.E.C. membership.
In Luxembourg demilitarization has been an economic 
benefit since military expenditures could be diverted for 
other uses. However, in most cases the neutralized nation 
has had to continue high military spending in order to 
maintain forces capable of defending the neutralized status.
Neutralization imposes some political handicaps on 
the neutralized nation since that nation must abide by the 
neutral policy and the restrictions which it entails.
- Neutralized nations have been handicapped In their 
ability to grow in power. This is most obviously seen in 
the absence of territorial expansion and in the fact that 
these nations have not used force or other pressure on 
other nations. They must be content with their lot. 
Conversely, these nations have not decreased in power either 
where the agreement was not violated. When it is violated, 
of course the nation suffers. Belgium did lose its inde­
pendence for a while when invaded by Germany, and Laos is 
weakened by war. Switzerland has been an exception, being 
able to maintain absolute control over its own Internal 
affaire. In its foreign affairs it has refrained from 
making treaty commitments with foreign powers. This has 
not been a handicap because it conforms to the Interests 
of the nation.
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The neutralization of Laos has produced an artificial 
coalition government. This is an Infringement on the 
nation since It is not free to modify its own government 
In ways which would make it more effective. Attempts to 
form a government representing the majority party have been 
defeated because it oould violate part of the neutralization 
agreement. Consequently, the government continues to be a 
mixture of incompatible parties opposing one another, with 
the communist party refusing to participate, and the 
positions assigned to the communist party being in effect 
unfilled. The Prime Minister has taken on these additional 
executive powers himself, resulting in concentration of 
actual power. In other words, the coalition government is
i
established only in form to comply with the International 
agreement but is a hindrance to effective government.
Black noted that the ultimate result of widespread
use of neutralization would be to further strengthen the
powerful nations at the expense of the already weaker
58neutralized nations. This is because of the limitations 
against expansion or joining alliances by the neutralized 
nations, and because of the enforcement powers assumed by 
the big nations. The latter would ultimately find themselves 
in a position similar to that of the Security Council of the 
United Nations, with authority and responsibility for 
maintaining world order.
■^Black, p. 64.
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FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE FACTORS
This discussion shows that neutralization may or may 
not achieve certain desired goals, and that it usually 
has many other results, some of which are favorable and 
some are not. These effects of neutralization give more 
clues about the factors which determine whether a nation 
orthe International situation is suitable for successful 
neutralization. An investigation into those factors will 
provide a basis for estimating whether an application in 
the Middle East would be feasible.
One obvious factor is compatibility with interests 
of those nations capable of disrupting it. Previously I 
pointed out that those nations which have Interests in 
the neutralized nation are the ones which should participate 
in an agreement. If they would gain by continued or in­
creasing involvement in the neutralized nation in the hope 
of gaining access to waterways, ports, resources, etc., 
they could not be expected to agree to a neutralization 
treaty or to comply with it if they did agree.
Not only must the initial agreement be in the interests 
of the participants, but as the arrangement is put to the 
test through the years, it must continue to be in their
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interests. Fred Oreene traces the continuation and final 
failure of Belgian neutrality through its history and 
brings out how that agreement was reevaluated and renewed 
each time it was confronted with a crisis. Sometimes the 
renewal strengthened it and sometimes weakened it, depending 
on the extent to which the guaranteeing powers were prepared 
to enforce it; but as long as each decided that the agree­
ment served its self-interest, the agreement survived.
Previously I said that an effective balance of power 
is important to the maintenance of neutralization.
Therefore, it must be included as one of the factors 
contributing to its success. The balance of power is a 
system which maintains International order by distribution 
of international power. When a nation attempts to upset 
that order and exert its power on other nations, the balance 
of power system causes them to join and use their power in 
opposition, thereby restoring order. This system may 
operate by deliberate efforts on the part of statesmen to 
use the power of their nations to balance that of other 
nations, or the balance may operate as a natural course of 
events. ^  When such a system is in operation, it would 
provide a natural incentive for nations to uphold 
neutralization agreements as well as other agreements
^Inle Claude, Power And International Relations.
(New York:Random House, 1962), pp. 20-24.
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providing international order. Conversely, the 
neutralization agreement can reinforce the balance of 
power system when guaranteeing nations use their power 
to stop violations.
Greene claims that neutralization is 1 limited to 
situations in which a rough balance of power prevails*1.
He sees the value of neutralization to be in the stabilizing 
effect it has on the international system, and this effect 
is judged by the contributions it makes toward maintaining 
an equilibrium in the balance of power. As examples he 
notes that Switzerland and Belgium were neutralized to 
contain the power of France which threatened to absorb 
them, thereby preventing France from upsetting the balance 
of power In Europe. The crises which necessitated renewal 
of Belgian neutrality were occasions when the balance of 
power was threatened, and the renewal of the agreement 
aided in protecting that balance.^ The neutralization 
of Laos could be seen as a partially successful attempt 
by the United States and the Soviet Union to set up a 
balance of power in Southeast Asia. As noted earlier in 
this paper, a reason for the failure of that arrangement 
is that Laos, being small and remote, has a smaller effect 
on the balance of power between the major powers than did 
Switzerland, Belgium, and the other European neutralized 
nations•
^°Greene, pp. 1042-1044; Lyon, p. l64n; Black, p. 36.
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The Princeton University study gives certain types
of areas suitable for neutralization and other types
which are unsuitable. They eliminate as unsuitable those
areas where conflict is only internal, rather than between
the neutralizing powers and areas where there is no
territory in dispute. Neutralization is most successful
where the neutralized territory has a capacity for self-
government, since this reduces the temptation for outside
61powers to Intervene. This supports my conclusion that 
a strong stable government is needed.
They also argue that the sense of nationalism should 
not be so strong that the neutralized nation would be un­
willing to surrender some of its freedom of action, but 
nationalism should be sufficiently strong to encourage 
the nation to stand up in defense of its territory or its 
independence. A further obstacle could exist if the 
neutralized nation would not accept a curtailment of its
participation in international collective security organi- 
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zatlons.
These factors provide some explanation as to why the 
treaty neutralizing Laos was so much more detailed than 
other cases and why, despite this detail, it was less 
successful.
/^Black, p. 66.
62Black, pp. 66 ff., pp. I50-I51.
A closer look at Laos provides some other reasons 
for failure. One obvious characteristic of the situation 
in Laos is that it was more complicated, with many more 
nations being Involved. Those nations were scattered 
throughout the world. There were Immediate threats to 
its success. Most significantly, neutralization was part 
of negotiations designed to prevent a major war which was 
developing, whereas in Switzerland and Austria it took 
place at the end of a war. Consequently, in these other 
cases, provisions forbidding hostilities and Intervention 
in other nations had been settled by force and were contained 
elsewhere in a peace treaty. Even in Laos the removal of 
foreign troops had been provided for in an earlier treaty, 
the Geneva Convention of 1954, but that treaty had been 
violated. The neutralization agreement again called for 
removal of troops, but it failed again.
The Princeton University study explains the differences 
between these cases in another way. It notes that 
neutralization in Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg was 
established and guaranteed by the same five powers, Inspired 
and united by a common culture. Even the four powers which 
neutralized Austria, despite their ideological differences, 
agreed that Austria should continue as a non-aligned state 
after independence. Laos was quite different because there 
was no fundamental agreement between the neutralizing 
states about principles and policies. They Mwere all
more or less directly involved in the internal affairs 
of Laos, and neutralization was proposed as a compromise 
solution to a complex international dispute". ^
63u.s, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Neutralization in Southeast Asia, p. 21.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
I have described the characteristics of 
neutralization, its purposes, its results, and factors 
which determine its success. It would be useful at this 
point to tie this material together and construct a 
model of neutralization which could then be applied to 
Israel, if it fits, or to other nations. However, there 
is no single model or typical situation, and the form 
which neutralization takes depends upon the situation 
within the neutralized nation and In the international 
system. For example, Switzerland was allowed military 
forces to defend not only its Independence but also its 
neutralized status. On the other hand Luxembourg was de­
militarized. The success of Swiss neutralization was due 
in large part to Swiss determination to be neutral, while 
Belgium was not Interested in neutrality. Brief treaties 
were sufficient for neutralization in Europe, but even an 
elaborate treaty was not sufficient in Laos. Austrian 
neutralization was established on the undetailed model of 
Switzerland, according to the Soviet Union, while the Princeton 
University study for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
produced an elaborate model similar to the agreement for Laos for
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possible application in Vietnam. These two models are 
very different from each other. Certain analogies can be 
seen between the situation in Israel and in other 
neutralized nations, but using any of those situations as 
a model for Israel would require exaggerating the analogies 
and would result In the conclusion that there is little or 
no application in Israel. Consequently, I will only state 
some conclusions and generalizations in summary for use as 
a basis for an application to Israel.
First, the essential purpose for neutralization is to 
Isolate local conflict from major power rivalries. In 
addition, as a practical matter, local conflict should 
first be settled by separate means and a balance of power 
established before neutralization is attempted. This 
Includes settling disputes with neighboring nations as 
well as establishing a stable government within the 
neutralized country which will persist in maintaining a 
neutral policy. This neutral policy refers to its attitude 
toward great power hostilities or Cold War rivalries. It 
does not mean neutrality with respect to antagonisms it 
has with its neighbors, although as stated above any 
disputes resulting from such antagonisms should be settled 
in some way. If these disputes are not settled, the major 
powers will always be tempted to Intervene. Neutralization 
cannot be expected to be a cure for deep ideological 
conflicts, involving either the great powers, the 
neutralized nation, or its neighbors.
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Secondly, neutralization must suit the national 
interests of all participants; that is, all nations 
capable of disrupting the status. And thirdly, 
neutralization guarantees the independence and territorial 
integrity of the neutralized nation. And beyond these 
three accomplishments, extra benefits may result.
The only requirements for the process of establishing 
neutralization are a statement of intention to follow a 
neutral policy, made by the neutralized nation, and some 
sort of agreement, preferably formal, between the great 
powers and certain other nations not to violate that 
nation's independence and neutrality. Additional treaty 
details and enforcement machinery may be provided as 
Incentives to comply with these commitments. Logically, 
the more of these extra provisions which are added, the 
more likely will be the chance of success.
With the scope of neutralization thus reduced to Its 
essentials, an application may be attempted. Perhaps it 
would successfully accomplish its basic purposes. If it 
falls to do this, the attempt may still be worthwhile. 
After all, “permanence" signifies a long time, and if 
neutrality Is maintained only through a period during 
which a balance of power prevails, that Is until future 
events upset that balance and a new balance comes about, 
it will have served a constructive purpose at least
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temporarily. And even if it fails, there may be sufficient 
benefits to warrant the attempt to establish it. In Laos, 
for example, the alternative to the neutralization agreement 
which was continuously violated would probably have been 
warfare similar to that which has been taking place in 
neighboring Vietnam.
It should also be realized that some unfavorable 
results are Inevitable In any neutralization situation.
This is especially true regarding the neutralized nation 
since it has to accept certain restrictions on Its freedom 
of aotion.
In recent years there has been a revival of Interest 
in neutralization. The attitude of world leaders toward 
it is bound to have an effect on whether they would be 
Interested in using it. There is Increasing disillusion­
ment toward some of the customary devices for maintaining 
international security. Collective security arrangements 
have failed to prevent the two World Wars and many other 
cases of aggression. Partition of Germany, Korea and 
Vietnam as a method to remove them from international..
conflict has only resulted in permanent confrontation.
64An alternative to those devices is being sought. 
Neutralization could provide that alternative.
This interest in neutralization may be seen first in 
the rise of neutralism in the Third World, which has 
finally received acceptance by the major powers. Many of
^Charles Yost, “Israel And The Arabs, the Myths That 
Block Peace11, Atlantic. Jan. 1969, p. 80.
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these new states did not want to take sides in the Cold 
War because they were too preoccupied with their own 
internal development. They resisted attempts by the 
major powers to align them into their respective blocs. 
During the early 1950's there was some favorable feeling 
within France toward the doctrine of neutralism; but as 
noted previously, these neutralist nations were not 
interested in neutralism. By the end of that decade, 
the major powers had accepted the strength of neutralist 
feeling in the Third World nations in spite of their 
efforts to align them, and in some cases even encouraged
65it. Soviet acceptance of neutralism was illustrated 
first by Its one-sided neutralization of Finland in 1948 
and then by the initiative it took to neutralize Austria 
in 1955.
Growing American interest was illustrated in the 
transition from absence of response to Finland's neutrali­
zation, to mild response to Austria's neutralization, and 
finally to taking the initiative in neutralizing Laos, In 
1962. The Laos case was the only time It was officially 
advocated as American policy and therefore cannot be taken 
as an indication of wide American approval.
Various Americans have shown Interest toward 
neutralization as a possible solution to the Vietnamese 
dilemma. For example, such proposals have been made by
65Lyon, Neutralism, pp. 19-20*
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George Romney and George Kennan.^ The U. S. 3enate 
Foreign Relations Committee study referred to in this 
paper was the basis for a suggestion made by that committee 
that neutralization be considered by the President for 
Vietnam. It is thus evident that there is a growing 
willingness to consider neutralization by both the major 
and minor nations of the world. Certainly this willing­
ness would be a factor in favor of its success if It is 
to be used.
66Black, p. v.
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION IN ISRAEL
I have chosen Israel as a prospective subject for 
neutralization for several reasons. The United States 
and the Soviet Union have become increasingly Involved 
in the Arab—Israeli conflict. There is serious concern 
that if war should break out there again as it did in 
1956 and 1967, the major powers might be drawn in, and 
the situation could develop into a world war. This in­
creasing Involvement is similar in many ways to the 
events which led up to the neutralization of Laos in 
1962. Some of the proposals which have been made by 
the major powers to negotiate clashing Interests in the 
Middle East, to supervise the cease fire, and to reduce 
their involvement have characteristics in common with 
the neutralization process.
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EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
We have seen that neutralization must, by definition, 
accomplish certain ends, and that it often has other results, 
some desirable and some not. With this in mind, we can 
select some objectives which might be appropriate for 
Israel. There are two main objectives: to guarantee the 
survival of Israel and to isolate the Arab-Ieraeli conflict 
from the Cold War.
These two main objectives are critical. The question 
of Israel*s existence is the basic issue from which the 
other issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict have developed. 
Settling it would therefore reduce most of the contention 
between Israel and the Arab nations, and also reduce con­
frontation between the Cold War rivals which have become 
involved by taking sides over the question of Israelis 
existence.
The Increasing involvement by each of the two major 
Cold War powers has been largely in response to activities 
of the other power. Soviet missiles are being Installed 
in Egypt for defense against American aircraft sold to 
Israel, while additional aircraft are being provided to
9k
balance this increase in military strength which the 
missiles give to Egypt. This arms race corresponds to 
the escalation of aid to opposing factions in Laos which 
had been drawing the two powers closer to war until It 
was stopped by the neutralization agreement there. Even 
if the local Issues are not settled to the satisfaction 
of all and a war breaks out again in the Middle East, a 
neutralization agreement, if obeyed by the Gold War powers, 
would guarantee that they would not be drawn Into the war.
There are other broad objectives which would be In 
the interest of the Middle East nations and the Cold War 
powers. For example, neutralization would reduce the 
costly and dangerous arms race, permitting diversion of 
. resources to economic development. It might provide 
enough stability to reopen the Suez Canal permanently.
It could promote the sharing of the area*s resources by 
the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Europe, if provisions are added to 
extend neutralization to other parts of the area.
This suggestion to extend the neutralized area beyond 
Israel raises an important question which will have to be 
answered; that Is, Just what the neutralized area should 
be. There are several reasons why an area larger than 
Israel might be preferred. For example, isolation of the 
Arab-Israell conflict from the Cold War might be accom­
plished by neutralizing the Middle East area, or by
separate neutralizing actions for each of the Middle 
East nations involved. It will be seen that while 
application to a wider area seems preferable in the 
perspective of the international situation, it is not 
very satisfactory from the point of view of the 
neutralized nation or nations. These points will be 
brought out as the purposes of neutralization are 
further explained, showing that the neutralized area 
should be Israel, and that the neighboring states would 
not be neutralized but would have to accept some 
restrictions.
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ISSUES TO BE SETTLED
We should not assume that neutralization would bring 
peace to the area. As I have stated, neutralization will 
not settle Ideological conflicts. It would not be expected 
to stop the Soviet campaign to extend communism into the 
Middle East and Africa, nor the American effort to block 
it. And it would not end the desire of the Arab nations 
to regain territory taken by Israel, nor the Israeli desire 
to defend Itself from Its neighbors. Therefore, before 
neutralization could be erpected to contribute to any 
sharing or cooperation in the 241 ddle East, the issues 
behind the conflicts would have to be settled by other 
means first. Without such a settlement, a fiasco of 
continued violations would be likely to occur as it has 
in Laos. Even In Laos the neutralization agreement was 
accompanied by reaffirmation of the principles agreed to 
at the 1954 Geneva Convention, which was supposed to 
establish a stable condition there. The Issues might be
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settled in a separate agreement,_or neutralization might 
be a part of a larger peace treaty. Neutralization would 
then be a way of stabilizing the situation and maintaining 
the balance of power once it has been established.
Before going further into the purposes of neutralization 
of Israel, let us see what these issues are, which must be 
settled. The principle issues are: (1) the existence of 
Israel; (2) Israel*s boundaries; (3) navigation rights for 
Israel; (4) the status of Palestinian Arabs, especially 
the refugees; (5) the status of Jerusalem; and (6) a 
permanent truce or peace treaty.
Israel*s neighboring nations and the displaced
Palestinian Arabs have not recognized Israel*s existence
as a nation. Instead, they claim that the country belongs
to the Arabs who lived there in what had been Palestine
before the influx of the Jews who built Israel. Their
stated objective is to eliminate Israel, although Israel
is recognized by the principal nations of the world,
including the Soviet Union and the United States. This
dispute is based not only on legal rights to land taken
by Israel, but also on strong religious beliefs surviving
for thousands of years. God, through Abraham, promised
6?
the land to the nation formed by his descendents. Both 
the Jews and the Arabs are descended from Abraham, and 
both claim this land.
^Genesis 15 J18.
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Neutralization of Israel would guarantee its existence 
and independence, and a prerequisite would therefore be for 
the Arab nations to recognize Israel and stop threatening 
to "push Israel into the sea". This guarantee would be a 
great benefit to Israel and an incentive for Israel to 
submit to neutralization. Along with recognized Independence 
would come the benefits of increased security and reduced 
defense costs.
For the Arab nations and the displaced Palestinians, 
this recognition of Israel would be a concession which 
they would not want to make unless compensated by other 
benefits. Arab national leaders have hinted recently that 
they would be willing to accept Israel*s existence in ex­
change for Israeli concessions, so this would not be too 
great an obstacle for them. However, some Palestinian 
leaders are not so willing to make such concessions.
Neutralization of these neighboring Arab states to 
guarantee their independence Is almost pointless, since 
the independence of those nations is not in Jeopardy.
This is one reason for neutralizing only Israel, rather 
than a larger area In the Middle East.
In addition to the question of Israel*s existence, 
there is a boundary dispute. During the wars which have 
taken place between Israel and its neighbors, Israel has 
expanded and annexed territory. Most of this territory
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has little intrinsic value but has strategic value for 
Israeli's defense. There have been several shifts of 
boundaries through these years and little legal basis 
for any of them. The original boundaries were prescribed 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 19^7 at the 
request of the United Kingdom when Israel was granted its 
Independence. This decision divided the land between 
Israel and Palestine, but neither of them agreed to the 
boundaries, and Palestine was never established as a state. 
Those boundaries chopped the land into small Indefensible 
parts, and it is now agreed by all concerned that whatever 
the final boundaries are, they should be defensible.
Israel has not stated what it believes its boundaries 
should be, except that they be defensible. Egypt*s 
boundary claim Is that Israel should give back all land 
taken from its neighbors, ivhich is sometimes interpreted 
to mean the entire country, and sometimes only the portion 
taken in 1967. The boundary with Jordan is also undefined 
and is complicated by the conflict over possession of and 
access to Jerusalem. This boundary question would have to 
be settled since neutralization means that once boundaries 
are agreed to, they cannot be changed except by mutual 
agreement. Lauterpacht specifically Includes in his 
requisites for neutralization that a neutralized state 
may not "cede a part of its territory nor acquire more
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without the consent of the guaranteeing states'*. 
Accordingly, neutralization would remove one of the 
greatest sources of conflict in the area. Border clashes 
have been a constant annoyance to both sides.
Without neutralization guarantees, a border settle­
ment would no more be able to prevent future border clashes 
than previous settlements have prevented them in the past. 
For the Arab nations, it would mean giving up efforts to 
regain lost territory, except that gained through the peace 
treaty negotiations. For Israel, there could be no further 
expansion and no further pre-emptive attacks to prevent 
Arab invasion. Neither side could attack fortifications 
erected on the other side of the border. This restriction 
would be seen by Israel as accepting a serious risk, since 
guns in Egypt or Jordan can reach targets in the heart of 
Israel.
Since previous settlements included United Nations 
observers and American guarantees, history shows that 
there is no assurance that even a neutralization agreement 
would prevent future border conflicts. Furthermore, if 
each nation whose borders are affected knows that it will 
not be able to alter them, except by an unlikely amendment 
to the treaty, they would be more reluctant to accept any 
boundary agreement at all. For example, Israel might be
^Lauterpacht, Vol. II, p. 244.
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willing to give up Sharm el Sheikh, but would want to be 
able to reoccupy It if denied navigation rights in the 
Gulf of Aqaba as it was in 196?.
These problems can be overcome by neutralization only 
if guarantees are more positive, stronger, and more con­
vincing than previous guarantees. They should be strong 
enough to assure each side that the other would not violate 
the agreement. Threatening weapons along the borders would 
have to be removed permanently.
A boundary settlement stabilized by neutralization 
would benefit both Israel and its neighbors by providing 
security and contributing to an atmosphere in which dia- 
truat and retaliation might eventually be replaced by 
mutual acceptance and cooperation. It would then remove 
the threat to the Arab states against Israeli expansion, 
and Israel would no longer be threatened by loss of its 
territory.
Neutralization of Egypt, Syria and Jordan Individually 
would further guarantee those borders. However, if a 
single neutralization of the entire area is attempted, a 
serious problem arises. In that case, there would be no 
guarantee of borders within the area at all. The only 
requirement would be that the big powers stay out of any 
future border dispute and let the local states settle the 
matter themselves.
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Another issue is navigational rights for Israel in 
the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. It has been the 
policy of Egypt to deny Israel the use of the Suez Canal, and 
the attempt to close access to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel
was one of the events which set off the six-day war in 1967.
This has been a form of economic warfare, of a type which 
could be prohibited by a neutralization agreement. A 
possible solution would be to neutralize or internationalize 
these waterways to guarantee their use to all nations. 
However, this would not seem to be necessary, and Egypt 
would not want to be denied revenue charged for use of
the canal. It would be sufficient only to open the canal
and to permit Israel to use both waterways. This could be 
done in the peace treaty and would not need to be repeated 
in the neutralization agreement.
The status of the Palestinian Arabs is complex. Some 
parallels can be made with the Pathet Lao in Laos and 
perhaps with the revolutionary elements which appeared 
in Switzerland in 1847. In each case, these groups were 
disloyal to the established government. They wanted to 
establish rule over part or all of the territory of the 
nation, and they had strong ties with neighboring nations, 
These ties meant that they opposed neutrality. The havoc 
created by the Pathet Lao serves as a warning that the 
Palestinians could wreck Israeli neutrality. However, each 
situation had its unique characteristics, and conclusions 
based on events in one case may not necessarily apply to
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another.
The Palestinian Arabs consist of those who fled from 
their homeland (mostly during and soon after the wars of 
1947-1948 and of 1967) and those who remained. About
700.000 refugees fled in the first of those wars, and there 
were almost 700,000 refugees again in 1967, nearly half of 
whom were the same refugees moving a second time. About
200.000 of the first group settled in the Gaza strip, 
originally under Egyptian administration, then under United 
Nations administration, and now under Israeli occupation.
They constitute most of the population of that area, with 
many still living in refugee camps. Most of the remainder 
of the first group of refugees, nearly 500,000, settled In 
the west bank area of Jordan. In 19&7 about half fled across 
the Jordan River, still in Jordanian territory. Some 
estimateb claim that refugees now make up as much as two-* 
thirds of the population of that part of Jordan not 
occupied by Israel, and they are a source of turmoil and 
political instability.
In Syria and Lebanon their numbers are not great enough 
to cause a settlement problem, but dissatisfied radicals 
among them stir up demonstrations and riots to keep alive 
the issue of returning to Palestine. In 19^7 still another
350.000 refugees fled across the Suez Canal into Egypt from 
the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal zone. Most refugees in
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all of these areas consider their present locations to be 
temporary, until they can return to Palestine. Their 
terrorist activities of 1970, including the hijacking and 
destruction of foreign commercial aircraft, and civil war 
in Jordan, have been reminders that they do not intend to 
be Ignored in any peace settlement.
In addition to these refugees In Arab countries, many 
Palestinian Arabs remain under Israeli rule. After 1948 
about 200,000 Arabs remained behind, making up about 9% of 
the population of Israel. Since the occupation of Sinai, 
Gaza, and the Jordanian west bank in 1967, this number has 
increased to about one million, about half of which were 
previously classified as refugees from the 1947-1948 war. 
Their numbers are now sufficient to cause the Israeli 
government a considerable administrative burden and a 
political threat.
Various solutions to their problems have been tried 
and others proposed. The U. N. has provided food, shelter, 
and education to an Increasing number of these refugees, 
numbering nearly a million. This is Intended to be a
o- -
temporary measure, but is self-perpetuating. Even if 
they were to return to their original homes, Israel has 
changed so much that this would not solve their problems. 
Furthermore, Israel resists their repatriation. Compen­
sation for their loss has been considered, with permanent
10 5
settlement somewhere else. However, permanent settlement
elsewhere has been resisted by the Arab nations because
It would be an acknowledgement that Israel was there to
stay. Israel has made efforts to Integrate Arabs living
there into the nation, and they have been given political
rights, but the Arabs are at a disadvantage still because
they are a religious, linguistic and ethnic minority. In
short, these Palestinian Arabs within and outside of Israel
6qconsider themselves a people without a country. 7
The future status of all these Palestinlnan Arabs is 
not a matter to be settled by a neutralization agreement, 
but it can have effects on such an agreement. If the dis­
satisfied refugees are permanently settled in Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon, they would be in a position to disrupt 
neutralization and the balance of power being maintained 
in the area* They and the Israeli Arabs might resume 
guerrilla warfare which would then tend to draw Israel 
and the Arab nations back into conflict in the same way 
that North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao have disrupted 
neutralization in Laos. Neutralization is seriously 
threatened when a faction exists which is not sympathetic 
to It and can disrupt It. It would be the responsibility 
of Israel to keep its Arabs under control or bring their
69Don Peretz, Israel and The Palestine Arabs. 
(Washington:Middle East Institute, 1958), p. 3? 
pp. 19-21; Don Peretz, "Israel's New Arab Dilemma", 
Middle East Journal, Winter. 1968, pp. 45—49;
Time. June 22, 1970, p. 22.
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representatIves to the negotiations. The Palestinian 
Arabs^in the. neighboring nations would be controlled by 
their host governments; or, if they would not submit, 
they would be treated equally with the Arab nations 
regardless of whether their ultimate status Is a state 
of their own or they become permanent citizens of existing 
states. If they continue to be scattered in several 
states, they might be represented by leaders from each 
-faction. The consent of the opposition party in Austria 
to neutralization negotiations with Austria provides a 
precedent.
The main interest of the dissatisfied Palestinians 
has been to regain their lost homes, and it is not likely 
that neutralization would satisfy that hope. Perhaps 
their cooperation would be secured if they realize that 
their future hopes lie in building a future for themselves 
wherever they are now living, and that Israel is here to 
stay. .
Next is the issue of Jerusalem, which both Israel 
and Jordan claim. Its status has shifted through the 
years. By the United Nations General Assembly decision 
of 1947, it was to be administered by the United Nations; 
but before that administration could be set up, it was 
occupied and divided In the war between Israel and Jordan. 
The dispute over the city is rooted In deep religious
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tradition for both Jews and Arabs, as well as Christians.
The status of Jerusalem may be treated as an especially 
critical part of the boundary question. Its status would 
be settled separately from neutralization, but any attempt 
to change its status, other than by mutual agreement, would 
violate neutralization and would Invite enforcement 
sanctions. Another way to treat Jerusalem Is to consider 
It as a suitable object for neutralization following the 
precedent of the 1947 United Nations decision.
As the final issue, a permanent cease fire or peace 
treaty would be necessary since Israel cannot be expected 
to be neutral while at war. Again, the Important point is 
that the neutralization agreement would not bring about 
the cease fire, but would follow it and help to maintain 
it by stabilizing the situation. A temporary cease fire 
is in effect at the time of this writing. It would have 
to be made permanent. A peace settlement is required not 
to meet the terms of the definition of neutralization but 
as a practical prerequisite, as explained in chapter two.
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EFFECTS ON ISRAEL
We have seen that neutralization would guarantee 
Israel its existence, independence and territorial 
integrity. This means that the Arab nations would 
have to end their goal of eliminating Israel and 
recognize its permanent existence. It also means that 
'those neighboring nations would have to give up efforts 
to regain lost territory. Israel's willingness to accept 
neutralization would depend on its satisfaction with terms 
of the separate peace settlement, Israel would be much 
more secure. The heavy expense of providing for its 
national defense would be reduced, and more national 
effort could be devoted to Internal development.
What other effects would neutralization have on 
Israel? Its national Interests are primarily those of 
providing security and Internal development; Israel is 
not particularly interested in taking sides In the Cold 
War ercept when the Cold War affects the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Israel has no mutual defense agreements.
Samuel Merlin observed that Israel is a nation without 
sillies. It has friends, but not allies committed to fight
109
for its defense.^-0 Even the United States, for all its 
aid, opposed Israel during its wars and put the greatest 
pressure on Israel to give up captured Egyptian territories 
in 1956. Consequently, the idea that neutralization Imposes 
on Israel the obligation to be neutral with regard to the 
Cold War or to open hostilities between the major powers 
poses no problem. Israel has not been very active in the 
United Nations and has received little sympathy from that 
organization, and therefore would not be upset by 
restrictions against membership and participation in inter­
national organizations. Israeli nationalism is strong, and 
Israel is not likely to be pleased to give up any of its 
independence and freedom of action by taking on the treaty 
obligations of a neutralization treaty. The usual case 
for neutralized nations is that this loss is compensated 
for by other gains, such as a guarantee of territorial 
Integrity and survival. For Israel, it might be worth 
this sacrifice to be free of setbacks and threats of 
attacks from its neighbors.
Although Israel would have no formal commitments to 
break in order to accept neutralization, it does receive 
military aid. For example, in 1969 and 1970 the United 
States provided $500 million in special military sales 
credits to be used to meet Israel's purchase obligations
^Samuel Merlin, The Big Powers And The Present Crisis 
In The Middle East: A Colloquium. (leaneck;FalrlelKh 
Dicklnson Univ. Press, 1968), p. 85.
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made during 1970* Neutralization would cut off this 
aid, but presumably the need for it also.
Israel's greatest objection to neutralization would 
probably be its unwillingness to trust the other members 
to comply, no matter how strong the guarantees might be.
In 1956 Israel withdrew from territory gained in the war 
that year, with promises from the United States and the 
United Nations that those boundaries would be guaranteed; 
but those promises were not honored in I967. Consequently, 
Israel is skeptical about trusting any such guarantees 
again. Also, Israel does not want foreign troops on its 
territory for enforcement or any other purpose, but prefers 
to rely on Its own people.
Israeli public support for neutralization would 
probably not be a problem as long as the Israeli government 
agreed to it. The government is sufficiently stable and 
popular that Its policies would be supported, with mild 
dissent from militants who would prefer to rely on military 
power. Israel would still be able and expected to maintain 
its military forces for defense. The government forces 
could detect violations within its borders and deal with 
them without need for outside help. In this respect, the 
situation in Israel is much more favorable than in Laos.
^Department of State, United States Foreign Policy 
1969-1970, (Washington: U.S.Government Printing 
Office, 1971), p. 79.
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t ~ £  effects on the bio powers
r Having considered the effects of neutralization on 
xfche Middle East conflict and on Israel, let us now turn 
to_ the big powers to see how neutralization would affect 
their Interests in the Middle East, 
t: c. In addition to matters of local conflict to be 
^settled, there is the conflict between the major powers. 
Neutralizations in Europe were accompanied by other 
negotiations which ended conflict between the major 
powers there. On the other hand, the United States,
Soviet Union and China did not settle their conflict 
over Southeast Asia prior to neutralization, and consequent 
continuing rivalry was a cause of failure there. If this 
means that an end of Cold War rivalry is a prerequisite 
for neutralization in Israel, then prospects for its 
success would seem to be hopeless. Yet the peace treaties 
in Europe did not end rivalries there, but rather ended 
conflict by establishing a balance of power. Therefore, 
if the United States and the Soviet Union cannot agree to 
end their rivalry, the establishment of a balance of power
between them would be sufficient. Both powers would wish 
to protect the balance by neutralizing the central problem - 
Israel.
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The United States and the Soviet Union have made some 
efforts to establish a balance of power in the Middle East. 
For example, President Nixon warned in a television inter­
view on July 1, 1970, that “it is in the United States1
interests to maintain the balance of power, and we will
72maintain that balance of power*1. This statement was 
made after reports of clashes between Israeli and Soviet 
pilots over the Suez Ganal. This argument has been used 
to justify the sale of American fighter aircraft to Israel, 
to balance the supply of Soviet missiles to Egypt. Actually, 
President Nixon is not so interested in an equal balance 
of power as in making sure that the balance does not favor 
Egypt and the Soviet Union. At a Los Angeles news conference 
of July 27, 1970> President Nixon made the same point by 
warning that when "the balance of power shifts where 
Israel is weaker than its neighbors, there will be war".
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been trying 
to build up Egypt to create a balance of power which does
not favor Israel. Thus, a situation exists conducive to
* \ 
an arms race and further conflict as each tries to create
its version of a balance of power. If at somevpoint the
two powers accept the situation as an acceptable balance
which would thereafter be maintained at that level,
neutralization could then be used to maintain it. The
"^Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, July 27> 1970,
p. 113.
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balance of power there would serve two purposes. For 
the big powers, it would prevent the other from gaining 
the upper hand. For the international community, it 
would provide stability.
While it is important to have a balance of power 
between the big powers, it is also Important that any 
neutralization plan be compatible with their individual 
Interests in the Middle East. These interests must then 
be examined.
Soviet interests in Israel and the Middle East are a 
continuation of the traditional Russian quest for outlets 
to the sea and access to the Indian Ocean. In the past, 
Russia was opposed there by Britain, and recently by the 
United States. By supporting Egypt and the other Arab 
nations in their conflict with Israel, the Soviet Union 
has put some of those nations In the position of depending 
on Soviet aid as their only hope to overcome Israel. In 
return, the Soviet Union hopes to gain privileges long 
denied, by which it could secure access to the Indian 
Ocean, the opening of ports to Soviet shipping, and 
generally extend its influence into southern Asia and 
eastern Africa. The Soviet Union is Interested in opening 
the Suez Canal to its ships. It has little direct interest 
In Israel, but can use the conflict to Its advantage.
There is also some interest in extending communism into
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the Middle Eastern nations, but this Ideological objective 
appears to be secondary to the national Interests mentioned 
above. Finally, the Soviet Union also alms to counter
73American naval power and economic Influence in the area.
Neutralization of Israel would not fit many of these 
Soviet interests. 3y providing security for Israel, it 
would also remove Israel as a threat to Egypt, which 
would then no longer need Soviet aid for its defense.
The Soviet Union would therefore lose Influence In the 
Middle East, and possibly lose some privileges it has 
gained in Indian Ocean ports. If Egypt were to be 
Included with Israel as a neutralized nation, this would 
result In an even greater loss of Soviet Influence there.
I explained that neutralization has been part of the 
Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence to encourage Third 
World nations to break ties with Western nations. This 
policy would not have much significance for Israel since 
the Soviet Union has not shown much concern over Israel’s 
alignment. As for the Arab nation^ most of them have 
already adopted neutral positions. For example, Egypt
*^For Soviet Interests in the Middle East, see:.
Arnold L. Horellck, "Soviet Policy Dilemmas In The 
Middle East", pp. 54-62, and Nasrollah S. Fatemi,
"The Present Crisis In The Middle East", pp. 27—33, 
both in The 31g Powers And The Middle East,
Samuel Merlin, ed. ;
Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Search For Security", 
p. 21bff, in Soviet-American Rivalry In The Middle 
East, Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed. (New York: Praeger,
1955)-;
Benjamin Shwadran, "The Soviet Hole In The Middle 
East", Current History, Jan. 1971, P- 13ff;.'
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responded to Soviet promotion of neutralism with what 
President Nasser called "positive neutralism". By this 
term, he meant freedom to accept aid from either side or 
both sides in the Cold War, depending on what source of 
aid would benefit Egypt the most, but without alignment 
to Its benefactor. Recently, Egypt has shifted toward 
increasing commitments to the Soviet Union, some of which 
would have to be broken if Egypt were to be neutralized 
along with Israel.
Soviet interest in neutralization would therefore 
not be derived from that nation's special Interests, but 
from those Interests which It shares with other powers: 
use of the Suez Canal, sharing resources, avoiding war, 
and maintaining the balance of power.
American interests in the Middle East have a fairly 
recent beginning. They are partly economic, especially the 
protection of oil investments and supplies. However, 
American Interests are more political, military and cultural 
than economic. An Important political and military 
objective is to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming 
the dominant power in the area. There is a strong cultural 
tie between many American Jews and Israel, and American 
political leaders are subject to great domestic pressures 
to support Israel. The United States also supports peace­
ful settlement of the conflicts there, and encourages
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7kpermanently peaceful relations and International stability.
Neutralization of Israel alone, or with the rest of 
the Middle East, would serve all of these American interests. 
It would hinder Soviet domination of the area. It would 
provide a way to pursue the policy proposed by President 
Nixon in his 1971 report to Congress, without resorting 
to military power. He said, “Any effort by any major 
power to secure a dominant position could exacerbate 
local disputes, affect Europe*s security, and increase 
the danger to world peace. We seek no such position; we 
cannot allow others to establish one. We believe that the 
stability of the Middle East requires establishing a 
balance in the activities of the various outside powers 
involved there. Each must be free to pursue its own 
legitimate interests, but within the limits imposed by
respect for the legitimate interests of others and the
75sovereignty of the nations of the area*1. Furthermore, 
neutralization would satisfy the political demands of 
American Jews for support of Israel.
7 kFor American policy in the Middle East, see:
Samuel Merlin, The Big Powers and The iMlddle East, 
various pages;
John C. Campbell, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An 
American PoUcy", Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1970, p. 51ff; 
John C. Campbell, “American Search For Partners*', in 
Sovlet-Amerlcan Rivalry, Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed. 
p. 199ff;
Bernard Reich, “United States Policy in The Middle 
East". Current History, Jan. 1971, PP* 1-12.
'^Richard Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy For the 19701s, 
Building For Peace", Department of State Bulletin.
Mar. 22, 1971, p. 392.
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EFFECTS ON ISRAEL1S NEIGHBORS
There are other external nations whose interests 
must be considered. The neighboring states have so far 
been discussed as possible objects of neutralization.
But they would also function as external nations in regard 
to the neutralization of Israel. The nations would be 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. All are at war with 
Israel and threaten to Invade it if they can build up 
their strength enough to believe they can succeed in 
defeating Israel. Their Interests there are to regain 
their lost territory and provide security against attacks 
from Israel. They are also Interested in a settlement of 
the Palestinian Arab problem in a way that would satisfy 
the Palestinians because the radical Palestinian leaders 
are a continuing source of harassment until this is done. 
This is especially important to Jordan where the 
Palestinians are a serious threat to the political 
stability of that country.
For these nations, the neutralization of Israel would
have the desired effect of stopping American military aid 
to Israel. It would provide security against threats of
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Israeli attacks; and decreasing the probability of war 
would be a benefit. Jordan could expect to gain internal 
stability. In the case of all these nations, the greatest 
objections would be the requirement to accept the permanent 
existence of Israel and the loss of opportunity to regain 
territory* Success would depend strongly on whether they 
are satisfied with the terms of the separate peace settle­
ment.
n£ Israel and the United States would Insist on an end 
to Soviet military aid to Egypt to balance its own loss of 
American aid. This would then create an objection by the 
Arab states to the whole arrangement. It would not be 
entirely a disadvantage though because it would release 
Egypt from its growing dependency on the Soviet Union.
This need to end Soviet military aid Is a strong 
argument in favor of neutralizing the whole area instead 
of only Israel. Since other problems would be generated 
by neutralizing an area containing several nations, some 
other way of accomplishing the same result is preferred.
At this point, it is clear that some restrictions must be 
Imposed on the Arab nations to balance those Imposed on 
Israel, but how this is to be done remains to be determined. 
We will now attempt to do this.
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SELECTION OF AREA TO BE NEUTRALIZED
In this discussion, I have argued that Israel should 
be neutralized, and that perhaps other Middle East nations 
should be Included either collectively or separately. We 
may now decide what should be done about including these 
other nations. Neutralizing only Israel provides for its 
Independence and territorial Integrity. However, that 
does not require the Arab states to make concessions to 
balance the sacrifice required of Israel; nor does it 
require Soviet concessions to balance those required of 
the United States. Neutralization of the entire area would 
effectively remove it from the Cold War but provides no 
protection against strife between Israel and its neighbors; 
and therefore, it would not prevent border clashes or 
Invasion of one Middle East country by another. It would 
only prevent Invasion by a big power. It would not add 
to the prospects of local peace. Furthermore, experience 
shows that the neutralized area should be united 
sufficiently to defend its neutrality, and this Is 
certainly not the case In the Middle East.
Another alternative, separate neutralization of the 
Arab states adjacent to Israel, would solve these problems. 
However, their complete neutralization hardly seems 
necessary since there is no need to guarantee their 
independence, and their territorial integrity would 
already be guaranteed by neutralization of Israel. 
Neutralization of these Arab nations would also Impose un­
necessary restrictions on them in matters not related to 
Israel. For example, these nations have experimented 
with various confederations, the latest of which Joins 
Egypt, Syria and Libya. These arrangements would not be 
permitted by a neutralized state, which is supposed to 
retain and defend its independence.
- Neutralization would also Interfere with Egypt*s ties 
with the Organization of African States and with Moslem 
nations beyond the Middle East. Since the reason for 
Including the Arab states is to require them to make 
certain concessions, the most satisfactory solution would 
be to simply impose those concessions as additional terms 
of a treaty to neutralize Israel. In other words, Israel 
should be selected as the nation to be neutralized, with 
the extra provision that some of the terms of the 
neutralization treaty also apply to its neighbors.
Still another alternative might be considered. The 
area to be neutralized might be reduced from the entire
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country of Israel to only those areas under greatest 
dispute. Cities and other small areas have been neutral­
ized in the past; for example, Cracow. For that matter, 
the Gaza strip was neutralized until the war of 1967, and 
an attempt was made to neutralize Jerusalem in 1948. The 
Gaza strip or some more habitable area could be set aside 
again as a home for the Palestinian Arabs and neutralized.
John C. Campbell has recently proposed that U.S. 
policy Include a wspecial International status for East 
Jerusalem,... special status for the Gaza strip (for 
example, under U.N. administration) for a period of about 
ten years,...demilitarized zones on both sides of the 
frontiers, (and) U.N. observers and peacekeeping forces 
in all demilitarized zones, subject to withdrawal only 
with the consent of the Security 'Council". Such a 
proposal certainly has merit, but it is quite different 
from the subject of neutralizing Israel. These areas would 
be neutral with respect to the Middle East nations instead 
of with respect to the Cold War powers. The status of 
these areas would be more effectively determined as part 
of separate peace negotiations, although the observers 
and peacekeeping forces suggested by Mr. Campbell would 
come under the neutralization agreement.
^John ' C. ..Campbell-, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An 
American Policy11, Foreign Affairs. Oct. 1970, p. 61.
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OTHER PARTICIPANTS
Other Arab nations which have been supporting 
Israel’s neighbors should be included as external 
participants if they are capable of disrupting neutraliza­
tion, and likely to attempt it. These nations would be 
Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly 
others. They would correspond to the minor European 
nations which were left out of the treaties establishing 
neutralization of Belgium and Luxembourg. They would 
probably not need to participate in the negotiations 
since they would not be likely to threaten Israel if 
the closer neighbors ended their hostility. It would be 
assumed that they would give their assent afterwards.
The expansion of Israel is not a direct threat to them, 
nor would defeat of Israel be of direct benefit to them. 
Their interests are derived primarily from loyalty to 
their Arab allies.
Britain and France could participate because of their 
national interests and their previous attempts to 
stabilize the area. Although their interests In the 
Middle East have declined since the loss of their 
empires, they still have economic Interests to protect,
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among which is access to oil resources. These economic 
interests lie beyond rather than in Israel. While they 
have been strongly dependent on use of the Suez Canal for 
shipping, they have learned to live without it, especially 
since many of the modern oil tankers are too large for the 
canal. These nations still need the canal to shorten the 
shipping route to the Indian Ocean, although the detour 
around Africa is not so long for them as it is for Soviet 
shipping operating from Black Sea ports.
Both Britain and France had a previous commitment to 
guarantee the independence of Israel through the tri­
partite agreement of 1951 (the United States being the 
third partner), but it became void when they withdrew 
support from Israel after the 1956 invasion of Egypt, 
Neither nation has much direct Interest in Israel, and 
France, being located on the Mediterranean Sea, is shifting 
its attention to improving relations with the African 
nations across that sea. For example, it cut off its 
supply of aircraft to Israel and has supplied arms to 
Libya despite the possibility that they may be used against 
Israel. For Britain and France^ neutralization would serve 
to stabilize the area, thereby protecting economic 
interests and peaceful relations with the Middle East 
nations. While they would be interested In assisting 
in establishing neutralization of Israel, they would 
probably not be sufficiently interested to commit them*-
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selves to defend that status, especially since they were 
rebuffed in 1956 by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union for Joining Israel in the attack on Egypt in 1956*^ 
Britain and France would not be essential to the 
agreement, and many other nations in Europe and Asia have 
similar Interests in the Middle East which are not 
sufficient to Justify their inclusion. The main reason 
for their participation Is that their efforts in the 
past have been helpful and they have offered to continue 
these efforts. As part of the "big four", they have been 
negotiating through their foreign ministers and through 
permanent representatives to the United Nations.
Count Reginald de Warren, Counsellor to the French Embassy 
in Washington, in a lecture to the Hampton Roads World 
Affairs Council on February 17, 1971, suggested that 
France could assist by mediating between the United States 
and Egypt since it retained diplomatic relations with 
Egypt while the United States did not. He also suggested 
that France might help the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to overcome 
the antagonisms and distrust which exist between them.
77For British and French policy in the Middle East, see: 
Benjamin Revlin, "The Big Fowers and The Middle 
East", pp. 39-^6;
Samuel Merlin, "The Big Powers and Israel8, pp. 84-91 
in The Big Powers And The Middle East.
. Samuel Merlin, ed.
To complete the list of participants, other nations 
might take part for the purpose of providing enforcement 
teams. These could be several individual nations without 
Interests in Israel, or they could be representatives of 
an International body such as the United Nations.
A proposed list of participants in any neutralization 
agreement would therefore be:
(1) the neutralized nation: Israel;
(2) the major powers: United States, Soviet Union,
Britain and France;
—  (3) neighbors: Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon,
and perhaps Palestine;
(4) other minor nations which might have Interests 
there: probably none necessary; perhaps Iraq,
Libya, Sudan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia;
(5) neutrals for enforcing purposes: several 
individual nations or United Nations representation.
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ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN CONTEIBUTINO TO NEUTRALIZATION
An examination of the Joint efforts which have been
made by the major powers to negotiate their differences
in the Middle East may give an indication of whether a
neutralization agreement could be made and enforced.
There have been negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union, by the "big four", and by the
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United Nations. These negotiations have intensified 
Since the six-day war of 1967. First, the United Nations 
Security Council agreed to a resolution in November, 196?. 
Since both sides of the Cold War agreed to this resolution, 
it indicates that there is common ground between these 
factions which might progress toward further settlement. 
Some features of this-resolution are steps toward 
neutralization. It provided for definite boundaries to 
be recognized by all nations which would automatically 
constitute recognition of Israel's existence as a nation 
as well. The resolution also called for an end to the 
war. It was very general in its terms, not identifying 
the boundaries and not providing for any guarantees.
^Bernard Reich, "United States Policy In The Middle 
East", Current KlBtory, January 19?1, pp. 3-5*.
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Since that resolution was passed, U. S./U.S.S.R. and 
big four talks have used it as a basis for attempts to 
reach further agreement. From April to December, 1969, 
bilateral talks were conducted between Mr. Sisco of the 
United States and Mr* Dobrynin of the Soviet Union. Their 
objective was to "achieve parallel views which would 
encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable
79
solution^1 If these talks had been successful In 
establishing such a common understanding, presumably the 
two powers would have no further grounds for contention 
over the Middle East, and this would then have removed 
that area from Cold War rivalries, permitting the Middle 
East nations to be neutral. But these talks were not 
successful. They were helpful in promoting the July 1970 
cease fire, and in the words of Secretary of State Rogers 
they brought about a "measure of understanding, but very 
substantial differences remain". While these talks went 
on, the situation actually became more polarized and less 
"neutralized" as military support by each of the powers 
increased in the form of Soviet missiles to Egypt and 
American aircraft to Israel.
79William P. Rogers, "A Lasting Peace In The Middle 
East: An American View", Department of State 
Bulletin. Jan. 5> 1970, p. 8.
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The "big four" negotiations have had three purposes:
(1) to enable Ambassador Jarring to resume peace talks
between Israel and Egypt; (2) to arrange and extend the
cease fire; and (3) to find a peaceful solution on the
basis of the Security Council Resolution 242.80 The first
two of these objectives were short range goals which were
successfully achieved, but have little to do with
neutralization. The third objective Is a continuation
of Security Council efforts discussed previously.
A new feature recently added to these negotiations
has been hints of four—power guarantees of whatever peace
settlement all parties might agree to. This is a further
step toward neutralization since It would require cooperation
between the "big four" and would be impossible if American-
Soviet contention continues in the area. Secretary Rogers
indicated willingness to consider participation in 
81
guarantees. Senator Fulbrlght made a similar proposal
to Congress for American participation in a force acting
under United Nations authority to guarantee compliance
82
with a peace settlement.
80„From statement of U.Thant, Oct. 23, 1970, quoted 
in Norfolk Ledger Star. Oct. 24, 1970.
SlReport of Dec. -23, 1970 news conference In 
Current History. Feb. 1971, p. 126.
J.W.Fulbrlght, "Old Myths And New Realities - II:
The Middle East", Congressional Record. Aug. 24, 1970, 
S14023.
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Although neutralization is usually considered in 
terms of major powers, we have seen that smaller powers 
with Interests in the agreement are also likely to 
participate. Therefore, we should not overlook the 
possibility of the neutralization agreement being 
initiated by these smaller powers, followed by concurrence 
of the major powers. Thus far, there has been no 
-initiative to build upon. The Arab nations, especially 
"Egypt, have been unwilling to negotiate directly with 
Israel. Consequently, the prospects for this action 
are slim. : - - ■— - ' •
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- ^NEUTRALIZATION TREATY
If Israel were neutralized, what would be the terms 
of a neutralization treaty? The proposed treaty can be 
divided into three parts: actions by external nations,
actions by Israel, and Joint actions. The special 
restrictions on Israel's neighbors, needed to balance 
corresponding restrictions on Israel, are included with 
actions by external nations and the Joint actions. This 
treaty would be negotiated after the six major issues 
behind the local conflict are settled, and would be 
supplementary to it for those nations which sign both 
treaties. It would be a formal treaty. Negotiations 
might proceed through several states; that Is, we could 
expect separate meetings-between the "big four" and 
between Arab nations, sometimes Including Palestinians, 
to work out agreements in the most difficult areas of 
contention, as is being done in the present negotiations. 
The final agreement would be one to which all parties 
would formally agree. The following terms are proposed 
based on the analysis of neutralization which I have 
made in this study. The external nations would agree 
to the following terms:
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- 1 Cl) They will recognize the permanent existence,
independence, and territorial-integrity.of Israel. They 
will respect and observe that status for Israel in every 
way.- They will refrain from all direct or indirect inter­
ference in the internal affairs of Israel.
  (2) They will recognize Israel1s neutrality and
assist Israel to comply with the terms of this treaty.
(3) They will respect the status of any other neutral 
areas adjaoent to Israel as established by other treaty 
(for example, Jerusalem, Gaza, or demilitarized zones).
(4) They will engage in no military, economic, 
political, or other alliance, the purpose of which is 
hostile to the Interests of Israel.
; * (5) They will remove all military personnel from
Israeli territory, including all civilian technicians, 
advisors, and other personnel who are engaged In pro­
viding military aid to Israel. They will provide no 
further military aid to Israel, but Israel may retain 
all military equipment already purchased or otherwise 
already promised by other nations. They will not use 
the territory of Israel for Interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries.
(6) They will engage in no military activity for 
the purpose of preparing for offensive military action 
against Israel. Weapons along the borders capable of
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attacking Israel will be removed. They will not use the 
territory of any country, Including their own, to Inter­
fere in the internal affairs of Israel. They will not 
provide further military aid to Arab nations for use 
against Israel, nor will the Arab nations accept any 
such aid.
(7) They will engage In no treaty which would be 
inconsistent with the neutrality of Israel. They will 
not attempt to Influence Israel to align itself with any 
nation or bloc of nations against the Interests of another 
nation or bloc of nations.
(8) After complying with the terms of this treaty, 
they will report this fact to the chairman (of the 
conference negotiating this treaty) and will meet again 
at his call.
(9) In the event of a reported violation within the 
territory of any party, that party will investigate the 
violation in cooperation with the observation team, and 
take action as necessary to stop the violation. They 
will permit Israel to participate in this Investigation.
(10) Any member requested by Israel to assist Israel 
to Investigate a violation will do so, along with any 
other party wishing to join in the investigation.
(11) They will Jointly defend the independence and 
neutrality of Israel. If unanimous agreement on Joint 
action is not obtained within 72 hours after requesting
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a meeting, those parties which do agree on enforcement 
action''will take action as necessary, except that 
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will take 
such action without the concurrence of the other, and no 
such action will be taken without permission of Israel.
Israel would agree to the following terms:
(1) It declares its permanent neutrality with respect 
to all warfare between other nations and neutralism with 
respect to the Cold War. — - " • ~ •
(2) It will not attempt to enlarge its borders 
without the consent of the other signatories.
~ (3) It will not Interfere in the internal affairs 
of other nations nor permit Its territory to be used to 
Interfere in the internal affairs of another nation. It 
will not permit foreign military bases on its territory.
(4) It'will accept aid and engage in other relations 
with other nations for the purpose of internal development 
but not for use against other nations. No aid will be 
accepted in return for any political obligations. It will 
defend its Independence and territorial, integrity against 
Interference or attack by any foreign country. It will 
remain armed for self defense.
(5) It will respect the political rights of all 
Palestinians residing in Israel. All Palestinians residing 
In Israel are subject to Israeli law.
13^
C6) It will cooperate with the observation team 
and provide that team with all information requested 
regarding compliance withzthe terms of this treaty, 
aw*„: (7 ) In;the event of violation within Israeli 
territory, it will enforce its neutrality and independence 
with all available means. It will keep the observation 
team Informed of the violation and actions taken, and 
assist, the team In any investigation. After investigation, 
Israel-wili-either take:action-requested by the.observation 
team or .request a meeting, of the parties of this treaty. 
n=^: :.(8) In the event Israel suspects violation in 
external territory, it.will immediately report the matter 
tor the observation team and request Investigation. In 
case: of difference of opinion between Israe1 and the 
Observation team, it will request a meeting of the 
parties to this treaty for the purpose of restoring 
neutralization. -r: _
(9? . It may continue its membership in the United 
Nations so long as it is not required to Join in sanctions 
against any other nation.
All parties would jointly agree to the following:
(l) They will abide by the terms of any peace treaty 
or armistice agreement made for the purpose of settling 
the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. This 
requirement would apply to all parties to this 
neutralization agreement, whether or not they were parties 
to the peace treaty.
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. (2) They will request the United Nations to provide 
-airobservation team which will observe Implementation of 
this treaty, investigate reports of violations, recommend 
action by Israel and the suspected violator, and request 
a meeting of this conference if action is not taken to 
stop any violation. If no such team is provided by the 
United Nations, the parties will establish such a team 
from their own resources, supplemented by members from 
any other nation unanimously accepted by all parties.
They will provide the observation team with all resources 
needed to carry out its duties.
(3) They will reconvene within thirty days after 
receiving notification from all parties that each has 
complied with the terms of this treaty. At that time, 
any conflict in intrepretatlon of the meaning of the 
terms of this treaty will be settled. The treaty will
be declared to be in effect when all parties are satisfied 
that all have complied and the observation team has been 
established.
(4) They will consult within 48 hours after receiving 
a request for a meeting from the observation team, from 
Israel, or from any other party. Upon receiving a request 
for action from the observation team, they will either 
comply or request a meeting of the conference.
(5) They will make no treaties or other commitments 
by which Israel would be obligated In any way to support
any nation against another nation, nor which would make 
Israel so economically dependent on any nation that its 
neutrality would be impaired. Trade relations with 
Israel are unrestricted, except for those restrictions 
specifically Imposed by this treaty.
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have attempted to determine whether 
neutralization would have an application to Israel, how 
it would be established and maintained, what purposes It 
would serve there, and what Its results would be. I have 
shown that it does have a theoretical application to 
Israel. The proposed treaty provides the mechanics of 
Its establishment and maintenance. Neutralization as 
applied elsewhere has been modified in that proposal to 
make it acceptable to all parties and conform to their 
interests as well as to international stability. Some 
of the items would undoubtedly have to be compromised 
in order to reach agreement. The agreement would meet 
enough common and individual national interests to 
benefit them all, if they can accept the risks and 
obstacles which cannot be eliminated. I have not proven 
whether neutralization would be successful. Success in 
this instance is relative to what is expected. It would 
achieve some goals and not others, as I have discussed.
I have also not proven whether neutralization will endure, 
but have only pointed out that there are factors in favor 
of and against its endurance. A better measure of its 
worth would be to compare it with the alternative of no
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neutralization. Without such an agreement to stabilize 
the balance of power, any peace settlement would be no 
more secure than previous settlements. One analysis of 
current developments in-the Middle East concludes that 
the probably outcome of the Big Four talks will be the re­
creation of the same conditions and indefensible boundaries
83
which preceeded the other three wars. Neutralization 
could provide the stabilizing influence to avert another 
war - one which might include the major powers.
^G-11 Carl Alroy, “Big Four Meddling In The Middle 
East". The New Leader. May 12, 19o9» PP* 15-18.
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APPENDIX A 
MODEL NEUTRALIZATION TREATY
This is a draft of a model treaty for neutralization 
proposed in Black, Neutralization And World Politics, 
pages 191-195* The authors erplaln that modifications 
to this treaty would be necessary for any specifio 
application.
Actions by neutralized state would be:
"(1) It will not enter into any alliance or 
collective security agreements, or participate in any 
undertaking designed to influence the internal affairs 
of other countries.
(2) It will not permit the use of its territory by 
any foreign country for the purpose of establishing 
military bases or of engaging in activities designed to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries; 
and will require the withdrawal of such bases and the 
cessation of such activities as may e^ist at the time
of this declaration.
(3) It will not permit the introduction into its 
territory of armaments, munitions, and war materials
mo
generally, except such quantities of conventional 
^armaments as are necessary for its own internal security 
and: defensive purpo se s.
ec _  _ (U) It will defend its independence and territorial 
integrity against interference or attack by any foreign 
^country.*
Actions by guarantor states would be: 
si e , f- B (1) They recognlze and will respect and observe in 
-every way the independence, territorial integrity, and 
-permanent neutrality of the neutralized state. 
r:ercc;(2) They will not commit or participate in any act 
which might directly or indirectly i&pair the permanent 
^neutrality of the neutralized state, or resort to the use 
;of. force or threat of force or any other measure which 
anight impair the peace of the neutralized state.
?r „:~(3) They will refrain from all direct or indirect 
interference in the internal affairs of the neutralized 
state, and. will not attach conditions of a political 
nature to any assistance which they may offer or which 
the neutralized state may seek.
'.(*0 They will not bring the neutralized state in 
any way into any military alliance or other agreement, 
whether military or otherwise, which Is inconsistent with 
its neutrality, nor invite or encourage it to enter into 
any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement.
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X5) They will defend the Independence and terrltorial 
Integrity of.the., neutral! zed state and reserve the right 
to come-to its defense separately in the event that Joint 
action. cannot, be agreed upon. ~ :
They: will respect- the wish of . the,neutralized 
atate-not to recognize.the protection of any alliance or 
military-coalition*: - c:
c: (7) They will not introduce into the neutralized
state, foreign troops^or military personnel in any form 
whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or condone 
the introduction of any foreign troops or military 
personnel. ^ f zt-ub:■ i:
(8) They will-not establish nor will they in any 
way- facilitate: or connive.at the:establishment:in the ; 
neutralized state of any foreign military base, foreign 
strong point, or .other foreign-military-installation of-, 
any kind.. _ ce = ~: > r-: e
z - - r. (9 ). They-.wi 11 not..use_ the, territory of the neutralized 
state: for. interference in the internal affairs of other
countries.. ________ .... r
(10) They will not use the territory of any country, 
including their own, for interference in the internal 
affairs of the neutralized state.
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Joint actions by the government of guarantor states 
and of the neutralized state would be:
®(l) They appeal to all other states to recognize, 
respect, and observe In every way the independence, 
territorial Integrity, and permanent neutrality of the 
neutralized state and to refrain from any actions in­
consistent with these principles or -with other provisions 
of the present treaty.
(2) They will undertake, in the event of violation 
or threat of violation of the independence, territorial 
integrity, or permanent neutrality of the neutralized 
state, to consult Jointly among themselves in order to 
consider measures which might prove to be necessary to 
ensure the observance of these principles and the other 
provisions of the treaty.
(3) They will establish an International Commission 
which shall investigate cases where there may be any 
reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of 
the provisions of this treaty has occurred.
(4) They will provide the International Commission 
with all the resources and authority necessary for the 
effective performance of its duties, including fixed and 
mobile inspection teams, in sufficient number, with 
adequate access to transportation and communications, 
and equipped with the necessary legal documents.
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(5) They wll-1 recommend to the other members of 
the United Nations, with a view to safeguarding the status 
of member states undertaking a policy of permanent 
neutrality, that the--'-Charter be revised to the end that 
permanently neutralized states: will not be candidates
JTor membership in the Security Council; will not be 
called upon to participate in- military,- economic, or 
.political sanctions against other states; and will be 
permit ted to absent themselves from voting in the General 
Assembly on Issues in regard to which an expression of 
opinion might at some future time involve them in dis­
putes between other countries or groups of countries*
(~6) They will consult as necessary to review the 
proVisions of this/treaty, - on~ the understanding that no 
changes will be made in its provisions without the con­
currence of the guarantor states and the neutralized 
state/
(7) They will agree to convene a meeting of 
representatives-of the guarantor states and the neutralized 
state-within six months of receiving a request for such 
meeting from any signatory of the treaty.w
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